Author(s): Rauf KARASU
The shareholders who have small amount of shares are not properly effective in management of joint stock companies with a large number of shareholders, particularly publicly held ones. Thus, shareholders are alienated from management of the companies. The significant decisions for the company such as election of members of board of directors in particular, are taken by a few shareholders who have large amount of shares in such companies. Even though the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6762 did not regulate any opportunity or possibility intended for eliminating or reducing this problem in joint stock companies, the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 regulates not only the voting rights of small shareholders, but also some opportunities to participate in the management of such companies. This study examines specific methods to inspire shareholders’ interest and to ensure their effectiveness in management of companies to a certain degree, namely "accumulative vote", "collective representation" and "representation of certain groups in board of directors".
The Journal of International Social Research received 7760 citations as per Google Scholar report
