

ULUSLARARASI SOSYAL ARAŐTIRMALAR DERĐİŐİ THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL RESEARCH

Uluslararası Sosyal Arařtırmalar Dergisi / The Journal of International Social Research
Cilt: 13 Sayı: 73 Ekim 2020 & Volume: 13 Issue: 73 October 2020
www.sosyalarastirmalar.com Issn: 1307-9581

RUSSIA'S INCREASING PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ISRAEL-RUSSIA RELATIONS, 2011-2018

A.Murat AĐDEMİR*
Sinan KÜÇÜK**

Abstract

Since the 1940s, the relationship between Israel and Russia has been complex and elaborate. After the new and demanding environment created during the Arab Spring in the Middle East for both states, Russia has become more actively involved in the local conflicts and diplomatic efforts, especially in Syria, and this situation in turn has had implications for Israel-Russia relations. Whereas Russia perceives that sound relations with Israel are of strategic importance; Israel, on the other hand, grasps the growing importance of Russia in the Middle East, and takes its relationship with Russia as one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy. With this understanding, this paper explores different features of the political relations between Israel and Russia and implications for both states.

Keywords: Israel, Russia, Relations, Middle East, Foreign Policy.

1. Introduction

Since the 1940s, the relationship between Israel and Russia has been complex and elaborate. Although the USSR had a prevalent role in Israel's establishment, relations between these states soon broke down, and did not fully recover until the 1990s. Israel and Russia have developed their relationship beyond the political domain, and this partnership caters to both states' strengths, strengthening their connections while contributing their security in the relationship. The close relations between the two countries are not only on the senior political level. To a large extent, a broad foundation of natural and human relations has been established between the peoples of Israel and Russia.

* PhD, International Security and Terrorism; Turkish Ministry of National Defence, mrtgdmr@gmail.com, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6773-3493>

** Turkish Ministry of National Defence, sinankucuk7@yahoo.com, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8048-9763>



Although Russia played a limited role in the Middle East until the beginning of the civil war in Syria, today it is actively making headways in the region. On the other hand, Moscow has been a destination of choice of Israeli prime ministers. Unlike many Arab states who cold shouldered their former arms supplier, Israel has been one of the very few states in the Middle East to maintain regular relations with Russia after the Cold War. Now it seems that both states are benefitting from this to upgrade their ties to a higher level which may reach a strategic one very soon. In fact, there are multiple converging interests for both countries to expedite establishing a realistic and pragmatic relationship, regardless of any differences in their views on some certain international issues.

Whereas Russia perceives that sound relations with Israel are of strategic importance; Israel, on the other hand, grasps the growing importance of Russia in the Middle East, and takes its relationship with Russia as one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy. With this understanding, this paper explores various features of the political relations between Israel and Russia. In this regard, after summarizing up and downs in history of this relationship, this paper analyzes the current status of the relations, and its implications for both states.

2. Israel-Russia Relations in Historical Perspective

The relationship between Russia and Israel has a long history, full of twists and turns, and since Israel became an independent state, relations have been difficult and complicated. During 1940s, the USSR supported the establishment of an independent Israel, because it believed that the new Jewish state would be socialist and thus help accelerate the decline of Great Britain's domination in the Middle East (Johnson, 1987, 527). Subsequently, in November 1947, with the other Soviet bloc states, the USSR voted in favor of the UN Partition Plan for Palestine (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tarih yok), which created the State of Israel. Three days after Israel declared its independence, the USSR officially granted de jure recognition of Israel on 18 May 1948, long before most other states had done so (Rubinstein et al., 2002, 192). Thus it was the second country to recognise Israel (after the United States' de facto recognition) and it became the first country to give the new state de jure recognition (Sofer, 2004, 6). On the other hand, it helped transfer arms from Czechoslovakia to the Jewish state during its Independence War in 1948 (Reich ve Goldberg, 2008, 507).

During the Cold War, political relations between Israel and Russia were poor, because of the USSR's help to Arab states such as Syria, Egypt and Iraq to enhance their military capacities. However, in the years of reforms of *perestroika* and the full liberalization of the Soviet regime, the situation began to change. In 1987 President Mikhail Gorbachev told that "the absence of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel cannot be considered normal" (Golan, 1987).

After the USSR disintegrated, relations between the two states began to flourish marking a new phase of bilateral relations. Russia began to see Israel as a regional and nuclear power that Moscow could use as leverage to assert its presence in the Middle East (Avineri, 2001). From then on, Jewish immigration, which started from the old Soviet republics in 1990, continued to be the most important building block in the bilateral relationship. Besides the Jews living Russia, immigrants from Russia and former Soviet republics account for a large percentage of Israel's citizens. Israel was the number one destination for post-Soviet Jewish migration, and that's why a significant Russian-Jewish population began to exist in Israel (Remennick, 2002, 516). These Russian speaking communities of emigrants who still sympathize with Russia and with their previous compatriots or relatives who live in the former USSR states have retained their connections in Russia. They therefore have increased the bonds between the two states (Dubovikova, 2014), and the ties between Russia and Israel continue to depend on this huge community.



Vladimir Putin was the first serving Soviet or Russian leader who visited Israel. His trip in April 2005 symbolized a complete change in the relations between Israel and Russia (Krichevsky, 2005). Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, whose family came from Russia, greeted Putin warmly in Russian and told him that “I want you to know that you are among friends,” and Putin described Russia as Israel’s “strategic ally.” Putin’s trip was a significant step showing the improving relations between the two states, as they tried to fix decades-long troubled relationship. Putin and Sharon discussed especially on security issues, and Putin tried to dispel the Israeli authorities’ fears that Russia’s nuclear assistance to Iran or missile sales to Syria threatened Israel’s security (Myre, 2005).

Israel has had reservations about Russia’s continuing relationship with some states and organizations, specifically Syria, Iran, and Hamas. Russia has sold some weapon systems, including missiles, which Israel feared may end up in the hands of Hezbollah. For instance, in 2006, Israeli troops found 39 Russian-made anti-tank missiles of AT-14 Kornet and AT-13 Metis in Hezbollah’s possession in southern Lebanon (World Tribune, 2006). In October 2007, when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert visited Moscow, he tried to block the sale of the S-300 strategic air defence system to Syria (World Tribune, 2007). As it is well known, Russia has also outwardly promoted and has been an important facilitator for Iran’s nuclear program. During his October 2007 visit, Olmert also held talks with Putin about the Iranian nuclear issue, and briefed him regarding Israel’s anxieties and stance on Iran’s ambitions; whereas Putin assured Israelis that Israel should be safe from threat, and explained that “Russia views Israel’s security interests as a significant component in its regional policies” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).

Even though Israel maintains good bilateral relations with Russia, they have also differing views on a number of subjects, and their interests in the Middle East may differ. Russia seeks to maintain working relations with all relevant players in the region. It does not want to shun anyone of importance. As before, it has been evident that Russia’s closest ally there now is Syria. But Russia also has rationally significant bilateral relations with Jordan and Egypt too. Additionally, while Russia maintains warm relations with Fatah, it also seeks good ties with Hamas after the latter’s victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006. In Lebanon, Moscow seeks to have good relationship not only with the Lebanese government, but also with Hezbollah. In this regard, the most obvious disagreement in their understanding of the region is the perception of the so-called Shia axis which includes Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. For Israel this alignment is a real threat for the region and its contentious policies risk to destabilize the Middle East. However, as Russia sees it as a counterbalance to fundamentalism supported by the Sunni Arab monarchies, it supports Shia.

Although there have been different opinions and attitudes on a number of issues, and the relations between Israel and Russia have had their ups and downs, both Israel and Russia have been equally capable of taking a pragmatic approach in order to continue their relations, and have significantly increased bilateral political and economic cooperation. With respect to the developing relations, the crisis in Ukraine in 2013 and 2014 served as a litmus test for Israel-Russia relations, as the Georgian crisis did in 2008. In the months after the Russian ally President of Ukraine was ousted from office, Ukraine has been the scene of an upheaval; Russia has annexed Crimea and pro-Russian separatists clashed with Ukrainian forces in the eastern parts of Ukraine (The Moscow Times, 2014). Israel wanted to stay neutral, maintained a low profile throughout the crisis, and avoided participating United Nations General Assembly voting which condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea (The Forward, 2014). That Israeli government was unwilling to confront Russia over the conflict with Ukraine made sense, given Israel’s generally cooperative relationship with Russia, based on the ties in different areas. On the other hand, Israel did not want to irritate Russia because of Russia’s decisive role it has played on the Iranian and Syrian issues.

3. Israel-Russia Relations after Syrian Crisis



The Arab Spring has created a challenging environment in the Middle East for both Russia and Israel. Russia has become more actively involved in the local conflicts and diplomatic efforts, especially in Syria, and this situation in turn has had implications for Israel-Russia relations.

As it is well known, Russia has been backing Syria since the crisis in that country has been raging on since March 2011. Russia follows a high-profile policy, and it has taken a strong stand in support of Syria and against international action. As one of five permanent members of United Nations Security Council, it has vetoed any sanctions against the Syrian government put before the Security Council (The Guardian, 2011) by declaring that Syria needed dialogue and not sanctions (Ynet News, 2011). Russia views Syria as a major partner in the region, with whom it has good political, military, and economic relations. Syria has been a significant ally for Russia to expand its influence zone in the Middle East. For that reason, Russia has regularly offered military, economic and social aid to Syria, and in turn Syria has become a dependable friend for Moscow.

Almost one year later after Putin visited Israel, Netanyahu went to Moscow in May 2013, where he held talks with Putin about the Syrian crisis. He requested Putin not to sell Syria the previously mentioned advanced air defence system, the S-300, and expressed his anxiety at Russia's shipment of Yakhont anti-ship missiles to Syria (Tétrault-Farber, 2013), while Putin criticized Israeli air strikes in Syria (Gutterman, 2013). Netanyahu made a second trip to Moscow in the same year in November. After he could not convince the United States, he tried to use Russia's leverage for tougher terms in a possible nuclear accord with Iran (Williams, 2013). During the visit, Israeli officials, confounded by the United States' Middle East policy, searched ways to enhance security cooperation with Russia without jeopardizing its preeminent partnership with the United States. Acknowledging a shared frustration with Saudi Arabia and other states in the gulf region over Washington's perceived wavering on Iran, Israeli officials sought to cultivate additional sources of support for its diplomatic and security agenda.

When the Arab Spring fever began to affect Syria, Israel did not want to be involved in the crisis, and kept a low profile (Berti, 2013, 136). However, as the security deterioration continued, Israel has installed red lines to make sure that significant military systems would not fall into the hands of militant groups, and it declared that it would act to restrict the transfer of advanced equipment and weapons to Hezbollah (Zitun, 2013). After the deployment of the Russian troops to Syria, and Russia's increasing involvement in the Syrian crisis (The Times of Israel, 2015a), Netanyahu visited Moscow in September 2015 to discuss with Putin the implications of Russia's growing military presence in the civil war in Syria (The Times of Israel, 2015b). Netanyahu brought with him to Moscow important military and security officials including Israel Defence Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot, IDF Director of Military Intelligence Major General Hertzi HaLevi and National Security Adviser Yossi Cohen (Yan et al., 2015). The presence of these officials with Netanyahu in Russia was notable. Netanyahu tried to demonstrate Russia the importance of the situation on Israel's Syrian border and their determination to continue airstrikes on critical Hezbollah targets in Syria (Gross, 2015). "It's very important to come here in order to explain our position and do everything so there are no misunderstandings of our region or yours," said Netanyahu (Sputnik News, 2015), and both leaders discussed the coordination of military activities in Syria to avoid accidental fire. At the same time, Netanyahu stressed Israel's policy "to do everything to stop weapons from being sent to Hezbollah" (Tsvetkova, 2015). Putin condemned the rocket attacks on Israel, and said that Moscow's operations in the region would be "very responsible" (Beaumontin, 2015). Moreover, he assured Netanyahu that Syria was not in a condition of opening a second front against Israel, and told that "the Syrians are busy fighting for their own statehood" (RT News, 2015). After Russia began airstrikes in Syria, it informed Israel ahead of its operations, and the advance notice showed the understanding reached between Israel and Russia (Pileggi, 2015). In this respect, in October 2015, senior military officials held meetings to coordinate the operations, and discussed the ways to avoid "accidentally clashing or scrambling each other's communications" (The Times of Israel, 2015c).



Each side made great effort to get this “deconfliction” agreement work flawlessly, and for this reason, mutual visits reached a record number in recent years. According to Alexey Drobinin, deputy chief of mission at the Russian Embassy in Tel Aviv, 2016 was the most remarkable year in terms of political dialogues between two countries in their history. Many high-level delegations mutually visited each state and ensured the well functioning of the “deconfliction” agreement (Frantzman, 2017). Year 2017 surpassed even 2016 in terms of the frequency of the Russian-Israeli high level contacts. There were two face to face meetings, on March 9 and August 21 between Putin and Netanyahu in the year. Agenda items discussed were mostly Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, and Iranian presence in the region. Israel’s concerns over Iran and its activities in Syria were seen in Israeli officials’ statements throughout the year. In one of his statements Israel Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman expressed Israel’s determination not to tolerate Iran’s presence in Syria, telling that Israel “will not allow Shiite and Iranian entrenchment in Syria. And we will not allow all of Syria to become a forward-operating base against the State of Israel. Whoever doesn’t understand that-should understand that” (The Times of Israel, 2017a). The year 2018 also followed the suit. For the new year celebration, Netanyahu issued a statement praising Putin for the “excellent ties” between the two countries (Keinon, 2018). Soon afterwards, he met with Putin in Moscow on 29 January 2018. After this visit a large security delegation from Russia visited Israel at the early days of February 2018. The main topic of these meetings and talks was Iran and Hezbollah (Khoury, 2018). These interactions are clearly the result of the strategic and security concerns of both states, but at the same time, are also strong signs of flourishing bilateral relations.

The meetings between Netanyahu and Putin, and the close relations between state officials have demonstrated just how far ties between Israel and Russia have progressed since end of the Cold War. Today the situation in the Middle East is complicated, and the various regional interests of Russia and Israel in the Middle East reveal many overlapping points. Both countries have been hit hard by terrorism, and it seems that they aim and wish to cooperate in the war on terror. That’s why the defence authorities of the two states have started in an important dialogue.

On the other hand, Israel considers the growing Russian presence (as shown, for instance, by the arms deal between Russia and Egypt (Defense Industry Daily, 2016) after the removal of Muslim Brotherhood from government) in the Middle East especially after the Arab Spring. For Israel, Russia has too many connections (Syria, Iran, Palestinians, and Egypt) in the Middle East which may affect Israel’s foreign policy towards Arab states; and the developments in connection with Russia may have disturbing results for Israel. For instance, after the removal of President Muhammad Morsi from office, Egyptian leader Abdul Fattah al-Sisi chose Russia as his first visit to a non-Arab country. In the wake of that coup in Egypt, the United States delayed the transfer of certain weapon systems to Egypt, and spurred Sisi to seek Moscow’s help in transforming Egypt’s military acquisition sources (Schenker and Trager, 2014). According to the reports, Egypt and Russia signed a \$3 billion weapons deal which included the sale of “MiG-29s, an unspecified air defense component, Mi-35 attack helicopters, light weapons and ammunition, and coastal anti-ship complexes” (Defense Industry Daily, 2016). On the other hand, Russia was one of the states that took part in the nuclear negotiations with Iran (Davenport, 2017). Moreover, since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Russia has gradually become one of the main players in this issue, and is committed to promoting alternatives to solve the Syrian problem that will ensure its future position in the Middle East (Magen, 2013), along with the bases it will hold (Pinchuk, 2017).

In the first months of the Syrian crisis, Israel did not take sides in the struggle, and its response was cautious and limited (Greenberg, 2011). However, the uprisings in Arab World have been a golden opportunity for Iran to pursue its short and long term interests on political and military domination of the Middle East. Iran has increased its influence in the region, has full support for Syria today, and contemporary Syrian-Iranian alliance bothers Israel. In short, Iran and its activities especially in Syria are the only serious threat for Israel at the moment, and security remains Israel’s main preoccupation. As security has the top priority on Israel’s foreign relations agenda, and as Israeli officials know very well that Moscow is a close partner of the Syrian regime



of Bashar Assad, they continue to coordinate their actions with Russia with respect to Iran's activities as well. At the same time, as the war in Syria moved towards a new phase, Netanyahu has urged Syrian President Bashar Assad that Israel will use force to prevent Iran's any attempt to establish any military presence in Syria. The warning was a strong sign for Israel's "non-intervention policy" change which had been maintained since the beginning of the civil war. Until the end of 2017, Israel only targeted Hezbollah terrorist organization and "there was no direct targeting of the Syrian Army or of Assad" (The Times of Israel, 2017b). However, Israel's this stance did not last very long. On 10 February 2018, after an Iranian drone's violation of the Israeli air space, Israel Air Force units immediately intercepted and shot down the drone. As a part of the mission, Israeli jets also hit the command and control center of Iranian drone in Palmyra, Syria where they faced heavy air defense artillery fires of Syrian Army as a result of which one Israeli jet crashed. Israel's response was very harsh. Israeli Air Force hit "eight Syrian targets, including three aerial defense batteries, and four Iranian positions that it described as part of Iran's military entrenchment in Syria" (Kershner et al., 2018). This was the first direct confrontation of Israel and Russia backed Syria, which had been avoided so long by Russia and Israel.

Conclusions

Israel and Russia have good bilateral relations that have developed over the years. Compared with the past, today, the level, scope, and importance of relations between Israel and Russia are unprecedented. Both states see each other as an important friend and seek to establish mutual understanding to improve cooperation in different areas. Relations between Israel and Russia have implications beyond their borders, and their partnership has influenced international politics especially across the Middle East. While Russia tries to be a dominant actor in the Middle East, and tries to wield influence in the region, for its part, Israel carefully keeps an eye on the risks that could challenge its security and interests, while following both Iran's ongoing efforts to acquire a nuclear capacity as well as the transforming environment in the neighboring countries.

Due to Russia's growing influence in the Middle East, especially its control over Syria and Iran, and United States priority shifts, some Israeli pundits and officials advocate that stronger ties with Russia will contribute more for Israel's security policies (Ferziger and Wainern, 2018). Nevertheless, there are still some delicate issues between Israel and Russia in terms of Russia's goals in the region and its complex relationships with Iran, Hezbollah and Syrian Regime. Therefore, Russian-Israeli relations are naturally complicated, but at the same time have never been stronger.

Although Israel and Russia face the same dilemma of how to promote their interests without harming the other side's political and security interests, they overcome this by seeking consensus and by avoiding dogmatic discussions of any kind. Even if both countries' interests differ in the Middle East, it is evident that they do not conflict. As for Syria and Iran, both Israel and Russia have some similar objectives, such as not wanting the reach of extremist groups to spread, and keeping Assad in power unless a plausible alternative could be found. In this regard, Russia's support of President Bashar Al-Assad should not be considered as an important issue for Israel. Israeli government seems prefer stability even with Assad in power over an unknown authority which may include extremists in Syria and their presence near Golan Heights. Russia's air defense assets in Syria are not also major obstacle for Israel's relations with Russia as long as good faith kept between them (Marcus, 2015). However, the latest Iranian presence near Golan Heights and an Israeli jet's shot down in February 2018 by Syrian air defense fire clearly indicate that a better coordination is needed between Russia and Israel in order not to cause any unwanted incident which may endanger current good relations.

REFERENCES

Avineri, Shlomo (2001, April 2). Israel-Russia Relations. *Carnegie Endowment*, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2001/04/02/israel-russia-relations>.



- Beaumontin, Peter (2015, September 21). *Netanyahu Meets Putin to Discuss Concerns over Russian Activity in Syria*. The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/21/netanyahu-meets-with-putin-over-concerns-of-russian-support-for-assad>.
- Berti, Benedetta (2013). Israel and the Arab Spring: Understanding Attitudes and Responses to the 'New Middle East'. *The West and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring*, Lorenzo Vidino (ed.), https://www.fpri.org/docs/chapters/201303.west_and_the_muslim_brotherhood_after_the_arab_spring.chapter8.pdf. s. 130-146.
- Davenport, Kelsey (2017, August 30). *Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue, 2003-2013, Fact Sheets & Briefs*. Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals.
- Defense Industry Daily (2016, April 7). *All Over Again: Egypt Looks Beyond the USA for New Arms*, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/all-over-again-egypt-looks-beyond-the-usa-for-new-arms-019091/>.
- Dubovikova, Maria (2014, July 13). Russia, the Fly on the Wall of The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *Al Arabiya*, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/world/2014/07/13/Russia-the-fly-on-the-wall-of-the-Israeli-Palestinian-conflict.html>.
- Ferziger, Jonathan and David Wainern (2018, February 12). Israel Says It's Counting on Putin in Syria, U.S. Isn't in the Game. *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-11/israel-says-u-s-not-in-syrian-game-as-russia-seen-dominant>.
- Frantzman, Seth J. (2017, March 25). Despite Syria, Israel-Russia Relations Are The Warmest In History. *Jerusalem Post*, <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Despite-Syria-Israel-Russia-relations-are-the-warmest-in-history-485062>.
- Golan, Galia (1987). Gorbachev's Middle East Strategy. *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1987-09-01/gorbachevs-middle-east-strategy>.
- Greenberg, Joel (2011, April 23). Israel Warily Reckons Possible Outcomes in Syria. *The Washington Post*, <http://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post/20110423/287307543591821>.
- Gross, Judah Ari (2015, September 21). In Moscow, Presence of IDF Generals Sends a Message of Military Urgency. *The Times of Israel*, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/in-moscow-presence-of-idf-generals-sends-a-message-of-military-urgency/>.
- Gutterman, Steve (2013, May 13). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin to Meet in Moscow. *Independent*, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-and-russian-president-vladimir-putin-to-meet-in-moscow-8614612.html>.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (tarih yok). *UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan) November 29, 1947*. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/un%20general%20assembly%20resolution%20181.aspx>.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007, October 18). *PM Olmert Meets with Russian President Putin*. www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2007/Pages/PM%20Olmert%20Meets%20with%20Russian%20President%20Putin%2018-Oct-2007.aspx.
- Johnson, Paul (1987). *A History of the Jews*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Keinon, Herb (2018, January 1). *Netanyahu, Putin to Meet 'Soon'*. Jerusalem Post. <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Netanyahu-Putin-to-meet-soon-522549>.
- Kershner, Isabel, Anne Barnard and Eric Schmitt (2018, February 10). Israel Strikes Iran in Syria and Loses a Jet. *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/world/middleeast/israel-iran-syria.html>.
- Khoury, Jack (2018, February 3). Russian Delegation Met With Netanyahu 'To Prevent Israeli Attack' in Lebanon, Syria. *Haaretz*, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/russia-sent-diplomats-to-prevent-israeli-attack-in-lebanon-syria-1.5786762>.
- Krichevsky, Lev (2005, May 2). Putin's Visit to Israel Loaded with Symbolism. *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, <http://www.jta.org/2005/05/02/life-religion/features/putins-visit-to-israel-loaded-with-symbolism>.
- Magen, Zvi (2013, May 17). Prime Minister Netanyahu's Visit to Russia. *The Institute for National Security Studies*, <http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2648>.
- Marcus, Jonathan (2015, December 1). Russia S-400 Syria Missile Deployment Sends Robust Signal. *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34976537>.
- Myre, Greg (2005, April 29). Putin Visits Israel and Tries to Allay Its Security Worries. *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/29/world/middleeast/putin-visits-israel-and-tries-to-allay-its-security.html>.
- Pileggi, Tamar (2015, September 30). Russia Notified Israel Ahead of Syria Airstrike. *The Times of Israel*, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/russia-notified-israel-ahead-of-syria-airstrike/>.
- Pinchuk, Denis (2017, December 12). Russia Will Keep Bases In Syria To Strike At Insurgents: Kremlin. *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-withdrawa/russia-will-keep-bases-in-syria-to-strike-at-insurgents-kremlin-idUSKBN1E610F>.
- Reich, Bernard and David H. Goldberg (2008). *Historical Dictionary of Israel*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.



- Remennick, Larissa (2002). Transnational Community in the Making: Russian Jewish Immigrants of the 1990s in Israel. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, s. 515-530.
- RT News (2015, September 21). *Putin to Netanyahu: Syrian Army too Busy Saving Country to Threaten Israel*. <https://www.rt.com/news/316102-netanyahu-visit-russia-syria/>.
- Rubinstein, Hilary L., Dan Cohn-Sherbok, Abraham J. Edelheit and William D. Rubinstein (2002). *The Jews in the Modern World A History Since 1750*. New York: Arnold Publishers.
- Schenker, David and Eric Trager (2014, March 4). *Egypt's Arms Deal with Russia: Potential Strategic Costs*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypts-arms-deal-with-russia-potential-strategic-costs>.
- Sofer, Sasson (2004). Towards Distant Frontiers: The Course of Israeli Diplomacy. *Israel: The First Hundred Years Volume IV Israel in the International Arena*, Efraim Karsh (ed.). London: Frank Cass Publishers. s. 1-10.
- Sputnik News (2015, September 21). *Russia and Israel May Disagree, But Always Respect One Another-Netanyahu*. <http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150921/1027294890.html>.
- Tétrault-Farber, Gabrielle (2013, November 21). Putin, Netanyahu Discuss Nuclear Agreement With Iran. *The Moscow Times*, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-netanyahu-discuss-nuclear-agreement-with-iran/490017.html>.
- The Forward (2014, March 28). *Israel Abstains From U.N. Resolution Slamming Russia Takeover of Crimea*. <http://forward.com/news/breaking-news/195444/israel-abstains-from-un-resolution-slamming-russia/>.
- The Guardian (2011, October 5). *Russia and China Veto UN Resolution Against Syrian Regime*. www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/05/russia-china-veto-syria-resolution.
- The Moscow Times (2014, September 5). *Ukraine Reaches Cease-Fire Agreement With Pro-Russian Rebels*. <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ukraine-reaches-cease-fire-agreement-with-pro-russian-rebels/506540.html>.
- The Times of Israel (2015a, September 22). *Russia Sending Thousands of Troops, Dozens of Jets to Syria*. <http://www.timesofisrael.com/russia-sending-thousands-of-troops-dozens-of-jets-to-syria/>.
- The Times of Israel (2015b, September 21). *Netanyahu Heads to Moscow to Talk Syria with Putin*. <http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-head-to-moscow-to-talk-syria-with-putin/>.
- The Times of Israel (2015c, October 6). *Russia-Israel Talks on Syria Military Coordination to Open Tuesday*. <http://www.timesofisrael.com/russia-israel-talks-on-syria-military-coordination-to-open-tuesday/>.
- The Times of Israel (2017a, November 22). *Netanyahu Presses Putin On Keeping Iran Out of Syria*. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-presses-putin-on-keeping-iran-out-of-syria/>.
- The Times of Israel (2017b, November 26). *Netanyahu Said To Warn Assad: We'll Strike If You Let Iran Set Up Bases In Syria*. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-said-to-warn-assad-well-strike-if-you-let-iran-set-up-bases-in-syria/>.
- Tsvetkova, Maria (2015, September 21). Israel, Russia to Coordinate Military Action on Syria: Netanyahu. *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/21/us-mideast-crisis-russia-israel-idUSKCN0RL10K20150921>.
- Williams, Dan (2013, November 20). Netanyahu Visits Russia to Lobby Against Iran Deal. *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/20/us-iran-nuclear-israel-russia-idUSBRE9AJ0JC20131120>.
- World Tribune (2006, October 19). *Israel Finds 39 Russian Missiles in Lebanon*. www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/06/front2454028.0791666666.html.
- World Tribune (2007, October 19). *Israel Urges Putin to Block Air Defence System for Syria*. www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2007/me_israel_10_19.asp.
- Yan, Holly, Oren Liebermann ve Greg Botelho (2015, September 21). *Netanyahu Visits Putin Amid Concerns About Russian Involvement in Syria*. CNN. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/21/world/russia-israel-netanyahu-putin-meeting/>.
- Ynet News (2011, November 25). *Russia Says Syria Needs Dialogue, Not Sanctions*. www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4153090,00.html.
- Zitun, Yoav (2013, July 9). *Ya'alon on Syria: We Keep to Red Lines*. Ynet News. <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4402763,00.html>.