NON-VIOLENT ACTIONS VERSUS VIOLENT ACTIONS: A LOGICAL RESPONSE TO ISLAMOPHOBIA THROUGH AN EVALUATION OF MUSLIMS’ MOBILIZATION IN FRANCE AND DENMARK

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Abstract
The present study aims to examine the degree of strategically implementation of nonviolent methods. In order to measure the impact of nonviolent actions two individual cases have been chosen respectively as Danish (cartoon crisis in 2005) and French cases (riots in 2005 and Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015). Violent oriented actions, which occurred in France, are less effective and unlikely to create social and political changes. However, nonviolent actions as observed in Denmark may change or challenge the process on behalf of immigrants' desired goals. Nonviolent actions can diminish the rate of Islamophobia while violent actions can polarize the political opinion towards restricting immigrants' rights. Muslim immigrants exposing governmental restrictions on their belief and discriminations would encounter social hostility and conditions of risks, in turn, leading to violent actions. The study retains both qualitative and quantitative features where archival research has been conducted and secondary quantitative data has been used.

Keywords: Charlie Hebdo, Cartoon Crisis, Nonviolent Actions, Islamophobia, Muslim Immigrants.

INTRODUCTION
Nonviolent actions are emerging as one of the important issues of the contentious politics and they are becoming increasingly significant in the twenty-first century. There are a number of factors that have contributed to the rise of social movements including, media, new technologies, globalization, global civil society, transnational advocacy networks and democratization, human rights and rule of law. In this sense, these factors have also facilitated collective actions, mass participation, involvement of third parties, mobilizing resources or structures, and increasing political opportunities. Thus, in the case studies that the present authors of the research have focused, the degree of positive social and political change depends upon strategically implementing nonviolent methods.

The authors mainly argue that strategic nonviolent actions are more likely to work and produce positive social and political changes. To clarify that view, two cases have been chosen that can present similar dynamics. As illustrated in the case studies, the policies focusing on nonviolent tactics have produced results and political change. Both cases, which are discussed below, are about immigrants' claims to seek their rights. In this sense, immigrants’ movements, in nature, can also be identified as social movements aiming to enjoy social, political and economic rights.

The other argument of this study is that if Muslim immigrants feel that they are discriminated against on the grounds of religion and ethnicity and there are more governmental restrictions on their religion and higher social hostility in their contexts, they would become more sensitive thus leading to the development of some conditions of risk and harm the fabrics of society, and in turn, violent actions which limit positive social and political changes. Therefore, Islamophobia emerges as a significant problem in Western societies. The perception of discrimination, particularly Islamophobia, has a key role in the mobilization of Muslim immigrants even such discrimination is not experienced. This study provides insightful points of views by evaluating the factors of their mobilization, namely the contexts of reception, the characteristics and perceptions of Muslim immigrants in Denmark and France.

I. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Historically theories regarding nonviolent actions are embedded in the formula developed by Gene Sharp, particularly in his masterpiece of The Politics of Nonviolent Action, where he categorizes 198 methods of nonviolent actions respectively as methods of protest and persuasion, methods of noncooperation and methods of nonviolent intervention. Considering theoretical aspects on nonviolent actions approach, Gene Sharp emerge as a preeminent character in terms of claiming nonviolent action as a method of political contention.

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Being inspired by Sharp’s arguments, Zunes (1994) provides notable insights into probable motives of increasing numbers of unarmed insurrections against authoritarian regime by suggesting three important factors: costs of armed struggle, relative effectiveness of unarmed insurrections and inefficiency of armed struggle against authoritarian regimes, which played an important role in declining of armed struggles and shifting armed struggle into nonviolent actions. First, armed struggles are very costly. There are economic (military expenditures), social (deaths, casualties) and political (refugees, ill-infrastructure of states after armed struggles) costs. In this sense, the events that happened in Ethiopia, Iraq (Gulf War), Vietnam and Palestine illustrate the shortcomings of armed struggles. Using this cost-benefit analysis, Zunes (1994) argues nonviolent actions are less costly than armed struggles. Second, unarmed methods are relatively effective. In this sense, Zunes (1994) states the role of nonviolent action during the repression which can change the process for the oppressed including the creation of sympathy, getting external support, defection of security forces and mass mobilization. Third, armed struggles against authoritarian regimes are inefficient in establishing pluralistic, democratic, and independent political systems. In other words, nonviolent actions with its power sources (popular support, power relationships, and pluralistic power) can be efficient in settling conflicts.

Sharp (1973) claims that the dispute can only be understood by means of power capacities and power relationships. More specifically, the power of rulers and elites is resulting from the cooperation and obedience of the ruled or governed (individuals, groups, institutions) to the authority. Political power emerges from interaction of several sources including authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources and sanctions. If the ruled or governed refuses to obey the rules and commands of the authority, the agreement which makes the authority possible is directly being nullified. As a result, the ruler’s power has been threatened by the denial of assistance, cooperation and obedience by large group of people. Additionally, Sharp (1973), in his article, highlights the importance of society by addressing another aspect of power, loci power, which concentrates on the structures of the society. Sharp also puts forward another term for nonviolent struggle: political jiu-jitsu. This term basically refers to shifting sides or power in favor of nonviolent struggle proponents. This term also explains that while the power of rulers is diminishing, the power of ruled is increasing vice versa. Sharp (1973) asserts that government’s power rely on obedience and cooperation. He also categorizes some mechanisms (conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion and disintegration) which nonviolent actions can generate political change.

Sharp (1973) defines nonviolent action as a political technique, which may include direct and indirect strikes against opponent’s power rather than using violence. According to Sharp, the opponents’ inadequacy in dealing with nonviolent action is resulting from the special dynamics and mechanisms of the technique that has been applied. In this respect, he does not acknowledge violence as a real source of power but to nonviolent action. Thus, the violent repression against nonviolent struggle can, in turn, result as a distribution of power and produce threat to existing authority.

According to Bond (1994), nonviolent action involves attributes and manifest behaviors. He sees nonviolent action as a nurturing popular empowerment and ‘tactics’ and nonviolent action and change may be seen as a combination of desired ends and means. He further claims that popular empowerment can impact change and this can in turn empower ourselves. McCarthy (1990) has also clarified the nonviolent action as an active process, non-institutional and mutual participation. As for Dudouet (2008), nonviolent action is a direct alternative for violent behavior and the nature of nonviolent resistance depends on taking consent out by means of noncooperation against brutal regimes.

In accordance with the working definition of nonviolent action made by Shock (2005), nonviolent action is illustrated as a collective, organized and sustainable effort to promote social change that occurred partially or entirely outside of institutional or conventional political channels. Schock (2005) who highlighted the importance of the nonviolent action argues that nonviolent action covers an active process of using political, economic, social, emotional and moral pressure to the existing authority by non-institutionalized ways.

Non violent actions can also be defined as an action comprised of mobilized networks of individuals, groups and organizations which are based on a shared collective identity, attempt to achieve or to prevent social change by means of protests (Rucht, 1999). Nonviolent actions try to change behavior, attitudes and ideologies including, policies and allocations of individuals, states, and organizations (Zald, 1999).

In the same vein, Tarrow and McAdam (2005) approach transnational contention by highlighting the importance of a single process, scale shift which is described as a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention involving a range of actors and bridging their claims and identities. Thus, the present authors, more broadly, focus on the dynamics of contention that
spread from one local area to another local one, therefore dynamics of contention (more specifically transnational movements) may lead to disseminate to other conflicted regions.

II. SELECTED CASES: FRENCH AND DANISH CASES

1. The Danish Cartoon Crisis in 2005: From a Cartoon Affair to a Global Crisis

The cartoon crisis, which occurred between the period of 2005 and 2006, is considered to be the greatest crisis in foreign politics that Denmark has experienced since World War II. This crisis was triggered by the release of twelve cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper (Gregersen, 2009). The Danish cartoon crisis qualifies as a social movement because it involved not only a single campaign, but also a reaction to the restrictive immigration policies including laws and procedures of the Government.

The escalation of the cartoon crisis in 2005 was also rooted with the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s refusal to engage in a religious dispute and settle the tensions between the Muslim Community and the Danish press (Slok, 2009). The Rasmussen government enforced restrictive measures that deeply affect immigrant and ethnic minority rights in Denmark (Carle, 2006). Slok (2009) argues that Rasmussen’s attitudes at the time of crisis can be understood as a political struggle over the integration of immigrants because Rasmussen was representing an anti-migrant party and he had electoral concerns at that time.

Particularly, his government enacted several tough measures, designed to limit the number of emigrants to Denmark, specifically those seeking asylum or citizenship through arranged marriages (Fekete, 2004). Jyllands-Posten, who published the cartoons on October 4, 2005, has a readership profile in the center-and right-end of the Danish political spectrum, and some of whom are highly critical of Muslim groups in Denmark. Therefore, one can claim that Muslims’ uneasiness against the newspapers was intensified by the cartoons.

2. The Emergence of French Riots in 2005 and Charlie Hebdo Attacks in 2015

a. French Riots

Before starting our discussion, it is necessary to provide a conceptual explanation of riots. In accordance with the resolution of The Council of Europe, riot can described as “collective violence occurring in public places and taking the form of attacks on residents who belong to a given ethnic group and/or the police, together with vandalism, and looting”. There are also several reasons that could trigger rioting, such as poverty, unemployment, unsuitable and unsanitary urban development, growing discrimination, and worsening relations between the police force and residents (The Council of Europe, 2008).

In this sense, it would be appropriate to explain what really happened during riots. The riots initially started and spread throughout the country after the killing of two young boys whose family were immigrants. These two young boys from a Parisian suburb were electrocuted after entering an electrical power station, in order to avoid a police check on October 27, 2005. This event triggered the spread of violence to the whole country. 300 cities, over a period of 3 weeks, were exposed to violent actions. Around 10,000 to 15,000 youths participated in the riots. The riots of November 2005 ended in three deaths, 10,000 private vehicles burned, and 233 public buildings as well as 74 private buildings defaced (Canet, Pech & Stewart, 2009). During the riots of October and November 2005, most French media sources provided daily updates on levels of violence (The Council of Europe, 2008).

Thus, Paris riots in 2005 can be assessed as a paramount incident since it provides notable insights into the mobilization of Muslim immigrants with the impact of violent actions. Since 2005, approximately 10 years later, French has recently experienced another violent action, which will be discussed in the next section.

b. Charlie Hebdo Attacks

France has recently witnessed one of its dreadful security crises in the last decade after three days of terrorist attacks at the office of satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo on Wednesday 7 January 2015 and sieges which ended with a police operation and killing of 17 people (BBC News, 1/14/2015). Evidence at the scene of the attack shows that masked perpetrators, Said Kouachi and Cherif Kouachi brothers, were Franco Algerians, and reportedly they returned from Syria and had significant experience with using firearms. Furthermore, Cherif Kouachi was sentenced to 18 months in prison due to terrorism charges in 2008 (US News, 1/15/2015). Hayat Boumeddiene was claimed to be another wanted suspect of Paris attacks and chilling photographs of her wearing burqa and posing with a crossbow has been released through media (Telegraph, 2/1/2015).

Immediate after the attack, millions in France have poured into the streets in support of free speech by waving pencils and carrying signs “Je Suis Charlie” in solidarity with the magazine Charlie Hebdo (National Public Radio, 2/10/2015). World leaders have also come together for a unity rally in Paris in support of those killed in terrorist attacks (Telegraph, 2/1/2015).
Having considered all these cases, one can argue that Paris attacks have been a paramount factor that provoked debates with regard to racing democratic rights respectively as freedom of speech and restricting hate speech. The media coverage has also played a crucial role in the case of Charlie Hebdo Attacks thus leading to reset the public mind setting and further raising the issue of socially privileged and socially deprived. In this respect, Bauman (2015) highlights the importance of democratic politics in terms of eliminating social inequality and social problems. Therefore, Paris attacks can be considered to be another significant incident that led to discussions regarding root causes of mobilization of immigrants with the perspective of violent or nonviolent actions.

III. FACTORS OF MOBILIZATION IN DENMARK AND FRANCE

According to Erturk (2015), there are primarily three factors in the mobilization of immigrants: the characteristics of immigrants, the context of reception, and the perceptions of immigrants. This section focuses on these factors considering the possible risks of violent actions.

1. Characteristics of immigrants

According to a Pew Research Center Report (January, 2011), the estimated Muslim population in Denmark in 2010 was 226,000 constituting 4.1% of total population, and in France, it was about 4,704,000 which is 7.5% of total population.

The socio-economic problems of suburbs where French immigrants frequently live are of importance in terms of understanding the vicious cycle of poverty, crime, and disenfranchisement. The rioters in France were actually disenfranchised second and third generation young people, who viewed such violence as their only choice in a society that sends them to the ghettos. Therefore, the French immigration policy is widely regarded as the least flexible in Europe (Haddad & Balz, 2006). In France, the youths from ghettos suffer from unemployment and discriminatory practices by the state (Canet et al, 2009). Furthermore, non-citizens are excluded from the political process, including the lack of electoral rights. They have been economically neglected during the course of the time in France as well as being poorer than the majority of the French population and facing social discrimination (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu). The socio-economic problems of Muslim immigrants in Denmark are similar to those of Muslim immigrants in France. The unemployment rate of immigrants from non-Western countries is about 7.9%, whereas only 3.4% of ethnic Danes are unemployed. Most immigrants from non-Western countries work blue-collar jobs (Lindekilde & Sedgwick, 2012).

2. Contextual Aspects

Having observed the French and Danish cases, we can argue that several contextual factors mainly affect the movement of immigrants. These factors include the opportunity structures and accommodation of immigrants as well as information-communication technologies (ICT), and media coverage.

a. Opportunity Structures and Accommodation of Immigrants

Under this factor, democratic rights and democratic process emerge as key dimensions that create opportunity structures and accommodation for immigrants. In this context, Tilly and Wood (2009) define democracy as a regime that sets relations, mutual rights, and obligations between persons and the government. Additionally, democratization is perceived as a formation of a regime, characterized by “relatively broad, equal, categorical, mutually binding consultation and protection.” However, it is claimed that there are some gaps in enjoying these rights in the sense that exclusions of immigrant society can be seen in both cases, namely French and Danish cases.

Thus, Pero and Solomos (2010) claim that some vulnerable conditions, including denial of recognition and lack of social and economic opportunities can push immigrants and their advocacy organizations to campaign for compensations. Thus, when immigrants are marginalized because of the cited reasons, they tend to find supporters to defend and promote their rights and conditions. Some platforms, like advocacy groups and civil society organizations, may help them in producing policy changes. In the same vein, Piper (2010) addresses the strategic importance of organizational and institutional networks, and coalition building, especially between trade unions and NGOs, which can mobilize social movements of immigrants for fair and equal rights of immigrants.

Though there are some distortive national interventions, there is a growing recognition that migrant rights have been guaranteed by some international conventions that concentrate on human rights and socioeconomic equality (Martin & Abimourched, 2009). The discrimination against immigrants, in terms of joining political rights, has led to their weakening in society and political segregation (Elisa, 2008). Immigrants come across grave problems in daily life. Schenker (2011) postulates that immigrants are frequently employed in undesirable jobs that include the three Ds (dangerous, difficult and dirty). Piper (2010) also approaches immigrants’ problem in terms of political problems they faced during the course of the time. He further maintains that main problems of immigrants are related to their status as noncitizens, and this has led to exclusion of immigrants from social and political structures, like membership in political
parties, nongovernmental organizations, and trade unions. According to Piper (2010), if immigrants had an opportunity to exercise rights then they would contribute not only to their home country, but also host country. This would, consequently, lead to a reduction in social distances between two countries.

In the same vein, the expatriates’ or immigrants’ entrance into politics, admission to the education system, or allocation of professional posts can reduce social distances among cultures and can prevent transnational and global divergences thus leading to the establishment of desired rapports between citizens and noncitizens (Mollenkopf & Hochschild, 2010).

Therefore, the policies aimed integration of immigrants are of importance. In terms of religious politics, there seems to be two main spheres: ‘secularist solution’ and ‘politics of recognition’. While secularist solution consists of banning religious symbols from public realm, in the ‘politics of recognition’ model, “society establishes legal compacts with specific faith communities.” France is an example of first model and Denmark is the latter (Gregersen, 2009: 93). As a result of secularist approach, for example, conspicuous religious symbols were prohibited from French public schools in 2004. On the other hand, there is no such ban in Denmark. Thus, Muslim immigrants in France have been considered to be at risk for future protests because of some restrictive policies to the immigrants (Haddad & Balz, 2006). Similar restrictive policies in France have also negatively affected relations between the Muslim population living in France and the French government (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu).

Having considered aforementioned arguments, one can claim that French integration policy have some weakness to integrate Muslim population into host society. For example, the youths who were interviewed, explained the reasons of the urban riots in 2005 by saying that “we want to be French” (Ossman & Terrio, 2006). Their main demand was to be further-integrated into the French society, and to enjoy greater political power, equal civil rights, and full citizenship status (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu). Rigidity of the labor market marginalized immigrant youths living in bleak, crime-ridden ghettos by depriving them of opportunities to open businesses and to work in sector jobs. In increasing numbers, these youths had no choice but sects that explain their alienation, justify their anger, and revenge (Carle, 2006). Similar integration problems can be seen in the Danish case, as well.

The accommodation of religions and religious groups in a country affects the opportunity structures of immigrants. Governments may apply several restrictions on religion such as the limitation of wearing religious symbols, having lack of respect for religious practices, banning certain religious groups, and so on. In this context, the Figure-1 demonstrates that the government restrictions on religion in France have been more restrictive than those in Denmark. In line with the Figure-1 indicators, both countries have become more restrictive in terms of religion since 2007. Whilst the government restrictions indexes of both countries accepted as moderate score, they are almost at the border of high score, which is 4.4. Therefore, it is clear from the Figure-1 that rates of government restriction index in both countries have increased dramatically during the course of the time.

![Figure 1: Government Restriction Index](source: Pew Research Center Report (June, 2013.))

![Figure 2: Social Hostility Index](source: Pew Research Center Report (June, 2013.))
“Restrictions on religion can result from the actions of governments but also from acts of violence and intimidation by private individuals, organizations or social groups. The Pew Forum’s Social Hostilities Index is a measure of concrete, hostile actions that effectively hinder the religious activities of the targeted individuals or groups” (Pew Research Center, 2009: 17). The Figure 2 shows that there is a great difference in social hostility involving religion between France and Denmark. The social hostility score of Denmark is regarded as “moderate” score, whilst that of France is “high” score. Social hostility involving religion has markedly increased in France since 2007. When considering Charlie Hebdo attacks, one can claim that the violent responses including 2004 riots and controversies over religion in the context of secular state structure have increased negative perceptions involving religion among French society, which made the society more vulnerable to radicalization and future violent acts. Nevertheless, when the state of government restriction score in Denmark since 2007 is taken into account along with the increased social hostility index, Denmark can be considered to be more susceptible to socially hostile expositions vice versa.

b. Information-Communication Technologies and Media Coverage

Information-communication technologies have enormous impact over the lives of people, whether through television, radio, and increasingly the usage of the Internet. In this sense, people can learn that there are others not only like themselves but also unlike themselves. New categories of “us” and “them” are made available for political mobilization and leading to nonviolent or violent actions (Ferguson & Mansbach, 2004). Thus, the media coverage has the capacity and role to “promote violent reactions, dislodge powerful people and motivate the formation of social movements” through the creation of public crises (Powers, 2008).

Having considered the case of Danish cartoon crisis in 2005, the crisis initially started and intensified through several media interventions, including newspapers in Denmark, France, Germany, Egypt, India, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Korea (Powers, 2008). Additionally, the visit of a Danish Islamic Organization to the Middle East Countries were covered by Arabic language media, and Muslim organizations established dozens of websites, circulating thousands of emails and text messages around the globe in order to mobilize the communities and generate support. For example, 20,000 people in Lebanon used SMS messages to organize demonstrations against Denmark and the cartoons (Slok, 2009).

In the case of French riots of 2005 and Charlie Hebdo Attacks in 2015, most French media sources provided daily updates on levels of violence during the riots. French immigrants have also used media strategically for their purposes. To give an example, while rioting, the French immigrant youths used new communications networks including, internet, mobile phones, and blogs to coordinate with one another, exchange opinions and information, and to circulate calls as a response to governmental actions (Canet et al, 2009). By contrast, it can also be argued that 2015 footages of Charlie Hebdo attacks have led to adverse impacts and particularly polarized the political opinion thus giving a way to restrictive immigration policies.

3. Perceptions of Muslim immigrants

a. Provocative Actions in the Context of Freedoms

One of the factors that led to both violent and non-violent actions after Danish caricatures can be revealed as the perception of Muslims by assaults and humiliations that targeted their religious symbols (Soage, 2006). In the case of the Danish cartoon crisis, several cartoons, especially the one depicting the Prophet’s turban containing a ticking bomb, played a prominent role in escalating the crisis throughout the world (Slok, 2009). It is fairly obvious that Muslims felt that “a genuine sense of pain at the portrayal of the Prophet” in these caricatures (March, 2011). Because of provocative interventions, the movement’s success, to some extent, has been adversely affected. When the French and the German newspapers reissued the cartoons, the nonviolent actions shifted into violent actions. Some embassies, consulates, and churches were burned and people were killed (Gregersen, 2009). More specifically, 100 people died and 800 people were injured at the end of the protests that occurred throughout the world (Carle, 2006).

The riots in France throughout history are a result of disenfranchisement of immigrants. In addition to this, banning of symbolic religious figures like burqas and headscarves has given rise to provocations of immigrants who live in ghettos (Bailey, 2008). Even some provocative incidents had an impact on spreading the violence throughout the country. For example, the killing of two young boys from a Parisian suburb triggered riots, as well.

In both Charlie Hebdo case and Danish cartoon crises two positions mainly present this cleavage. Thus, discussions have continued on the contexts of freedom of expression and freedom of religion. In Western societies, the issue is viewed from the point of freedom of speech, whilst Muslims consider the issue as problematic in terms of the lack of respect to them (Peters, 2006). Breadsley (2015) points out that the case of Charlie Hebdo being allowed to insult Islam while others are prisoned for racist thoughts seems hypocritical for approximately 6 million Muslims living in France. Therefore, there is a dilemma between
enjoying democratic rights and defining the limits of those democratic rights. In addition, Modood (2006) claimed that there may be legal interventions when such expressions lead to the acts risking public order and inciting hatred. Modood (2006) presented two choices for Europe: to integrate Muslims into society or to radicalize Muslims. On the other hand, Hansen (2006) rejected this point of view and noted that “It is not Europe that has to choose; it is rather those who wish to restrict free speech, whether they be Muslim or non-Muslim. They have to decide whether they wish to live in a liberal democratic society. If they do, they have to accept that they will hear and see things that offend them, sometimes deeply. They are free to protest them peacefully, but not to demand their criminal sanction” (Hansen, 2006).

However, the prioritization of freedom of religion may be rationalized by two approaches as argued by DeCosse (2010). At first, religion plays a moral role in maintaining public order; therefore, free speech mocking religion diminishes this role. Secondly, such offensive speech may lead to a feeling of discrimination on the grounds of religion by a less-powerful minority of a society.

### b. Perceived Islamophobia and Discrimination

A study comparing public opinion polls between 1998 and 2008 revealed that, in France, anti-Muslim prejudice has increased within this period (Bleich, 2009). In both Denmark and France, the public discourses and policies after 2001 have negatively affected the Muslims in terms of the increase in the feelings of less belonging to mainstream society thus yielding to alienation. Additionally, socio-economic marginalization and experienced discrimination have resulted in a sense of disaffection. For example, in Denmark, the arrangements which made difficult to obtain citizenship have led to a feeling that natives do not want them in Denmark (EUMC, 2006).

In France, there were two cases before 2004 about restricting to wear hijab in public schools: in 1989, the suspension of Muslim school girls wearing headscarves, and in 1994, the attempt of the Ministry of Education to ban on veils in schools. In 2004, wearing religious symbols such as a hijab was prohibited in public schools. The ban was defended in the name of preserving laïcité and integrating Muslim population into host culture. However, these were seen by Muslims as not only Islamophobic and racist attempts by the government but also an attempt to assimilate them through eliminating their Muslim identity (Croucher, 2009). They thus felt more negative climate in their context. They also felt that their needs have been less considered by state institutions as a consequence of the debates on the headscarves ban (EUMC, 2006). A survey conducted in France in 2009 revealed that Muslims in France perceived institutionalized discrimination against them in their context (Adida, Laitin, & Valefort, 2012).

Thus, the Table-1 represents the percentage of Muslim population who were discriminated against, victimized, and stopped by police in the past twelve months and felt that discrimination is widespread on the ground of religion or belief. Muslims in Denmark experienced more discrimination and victimization than Muslims in France. Interestingly, whilst Muslims in France experienced less discrimination and victimization than Muslims in Denmark, Muslims in France perceived more discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief than Muslims in Denmark. In other words, they felt more Islamophobia in their context. Therefore, one can claim that the more government restrictions on religion and increased social hostility might result in such perceptions even they experienced less discrimination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Discriminated (%)</th>
<th>Not Discriminated (%)</th>
<th>Victimization (%)</th>
<th>Police Stops (%)</th>
<th>Perceived discrimination on the grounds of religion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (Somalis)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (Turkish)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (Sub-Saharan Africans)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (North Africans)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EU-MIDIS Survey (FRA, 2009).

In the same vein, the Figure-3 compares four Special Euro Barometer Surveys which indicates general population in EU (including both Muslims and non-Muslims) felt that discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief is not widespread; about 40% of general population perceived it as widespread. On the other hand, when considered the individual cases of Denmark and France, this perception has remained widespread. France has the highest score in Europe in 2012 in this regard. There is another remarkable difference between France and Denmark that the perception regarding discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief in France has increased since 2006 onwards, while it has decreased in Denmark at the same period. This may also shows the increasing problem of the French society with regard to the discrimination on the grounds of religion, which may be deemed more negative perceptions for Muslims in France.
In sum, when perceptions of both Muslims and natives about each other have negatively affected, there would be no winner in this polarized climate. Therefore, one can argue that this is a kind of ‘lose-lose situation’. In this respect, both groups should act in a positive and reasonable fashion to respond such provocative actions, and should respect each other thus enjoying the opportunities of living in a multicultural environment.

IV. MUSLIM RESPONSES IN INDIVIDUAL CASES

1. Danish Case

On October 8, 2005, the Islamic Faith Community in Copenhagen issued a press release, and called the Danish Newspaper Jyllands-Posten to give an apology to Muslims and withdraw the cartoons. However the newspaper rejected their requests. On October 14, 2005, a major peaceful demonstration was held by Muslims against the newspaper. The case escalated from a national debate to the international political crisis on October 12, 2005, when al-Jazeera, a television network, reported on the cartoons and referred to the statement of the Islamic Faith Community. Additionally, 11 ambassadors to Muslims countries requested a meeting with the Prime Minister, in order to confront the situation. However, Rasmussen refused to meet with the ambassadors citing the freedom of expression in Danish and other free societies. The cooperation of Muslim collaboration, ISESCO, called for a forthcoming boycott on Danish trade on December 27, 2005 (Gregersen, 2009). Islamic Faith Community travelled around the Middle East, inciting reactions against Denmark until January 2, 2006. By virtue of these trips and visits, a long list of Muslim countries put into effect a boycott against Denmark (Carle, 2006). In this respect, immigrant transnationalism as a resistance strategy was generalized by marginalized groups from the world against Denmark (Joppke & Morawska, 2003).

After the boycotts, which started at the annual Muslim holiday where 2 millions pilgrims were in Mecca, both Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Carsten Juste, editor-in-chief of Jyllands-Posten, expressed their regrets about the cartoons offending Muslims (Carle 2006). The Confederation of Danish Industries (DI) played a key role in this change of attitude, by asking the Prime Minister to handle the situation as soon as possible (Slok, 2009). In this sense, DI’s role is of utmost importance in terms of third party involvement and achieving political change. In this respect, Galtung (1989) also emphasizes the importance of third party involvement. In the same vein, Staggenborg and Lecomte (2009) claim that the success of social movement campaigns depends on the organizational and ideological infrastructure of the social movement community. Thus, one can see a number of nonviolent actions in the Danish case.

Nonviolent strategies and tactics are full of examples in the Danish case. For example, a range of demonstrations and protests were carried out. The Jyllands-Posten was sued by a coalition of twenty-seven Danish Muslim organizations. In order to mobilize support, Danish Islamic Organization visited the Middle East countries, and Arabic language media covered these visits. Moreover, Muslim organizations established dozens of websites, and circulated thousands of emails and text messages globally. These reactions have also contributed to the internalization of the crisis by external actors. Diplomatic actions were also taken to protest Denmark, and more importantly, Danish products were boycotted all around the Muslim World (Carle, 2006). Additionally, Rasmussen’s way of dealing with the crisis was criticized by his secular colleagues, including the British foreign secretary and 22 former Danish ambassadors. The cartoons were also condemned by the UN and EU officials (Slok, 2009).

In this respect, some methods of economic and political noncooperation can be seen in the Danish case, as well. These types of methods are generally about challenging state’s power, legitimacy, and resources through boycotts, strikes, and a refusal to carry out duties to the state and other forms of civil disobediences (Shock, 2005). Here, in the Danish case, it would be easy to give some salient examples of political and economic noncooperation nonviolent actions. To give an example, national and international
consumers’ boycott changes in diplomatic representation; and severance of diplomatic relations (Sharp, 1973).

In conclusion, it is obvious that ignoring the sensitivity of religious issues has led to the escalation of the crisis all around world. However, many diplomatic initiatives during the remainder of 2006 and 2007 succeeded to put an end to the crisis. Overall, the situation seemed to have calmed down, despite the continued difficulty of selling Danish products in some Muslim countries. Furthermore, the cartoon crisis has given a rise to debates on how a state should interpret secularism and rights (Gregersen, 2009).

The Danish Cartoon Crisis strengthened connections among immigrants and cultural groups, thus creating mobilizations all around the world. Thus, Tarrow and McAdam (2005) discuss the importance of scale shift in terms of transnational contentions. Relational diffusion, as one of the pillars of scale shift which occurs when there are information transfers along connected lines, can be seen in the Danish case, as well. In this case, the authors of this research have also presented how collective campaigns can affect transnational social movements and provide opportunities for raising awareness globally.

Nonviolent strategies and tactics, including number and strength, timing, and concentration of strength can also be observed in the Danish case (Sharp, 1973). These factors have facilitated the process to a considerable extent for the goals of movement and desired outcomes. In sum, in line with the arguments of Bond (1994), the Danish case has created the “basis of change” as argued by Sharp (1973). In terms of mechanisms of change, in the Danish case, conversion and disintegration occurred in the sense that it produced a political change by virtue of external actors and methods of economic and political noncooperation (boycotts and severance of diplomatic relations).

2. French Case

The riots in 2005 paralyzed the government, and invited unwelcomed international attention of France’s immigrant issue in suburban ghettos. Prime Minister Villepin acknowledged that the fight against discrimination must become a priority, and that the effectiveness of the French model of integration was being questioned; however, he refused to call the unrest race riots or to institute a system of affirmative action to address past injustices.

As a reaction to riots in 2005, Minister of Interior Sarkozy issued an order that calls for deporting all foreigners found guilty of rioting, whether they were in France legally or not. Even, members of the center right majority in the National Assembly came up with an explanation for the urban violence: immigration (Ossman & Terrio, 2006). In response to the rioting, the State of Emergency in France extended police powers, authorized house searches without warrants, and empowered local prefects to impose curfews and prohibit assembly of large groups. Furthermore, the French government tightened existing legislation regarding family reunification and the acquisition of French nationality (The Council of Europe, 2008).

The riots in France (2005) were considered to be the result of the denial of equality, or even dignity, to immigrants. A conclusion can be inferred from this case is that it is important to include immigrants’ voices in the policy debates and political processes. This idea is reflected not only in the opinions of immigrants themselves who live in them, but also in the majority of the general population (Nyiri, 2007). In terms of nonviolent thought, French case does not conform to the principles of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC), and has some relevant shortcomings. For example, there is a variety of immigrant organizations operating in France, but there is no cohesion among them, subsequently, they cannot put pressure on the French government, because of their own interests (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu).

Considering the framework provided for the democratization process, which includes “(1) increases in numbers and connections among political participants, (2) equalization of resources and connections among political participants, (3) insulations of public politics from existing social inequalities and (4) integration of trust networks into public politics” (Tilly & Wood, 2009) specifically, the French case cannot meet these requirements. For example, the case has some shortcomings with building up trust networks and connections among political participants including immigrants. Nevertheless, the adherence to these processes could increase democratization in accordance with the will of immigrants.

In the case of Charlie Hebdo, Muslims’ responses have been symbolized by two attackers’ violent acts. A large majority of people including both natives and Muslim populations have disapproved such violent responses. France has been split into two points of views over the case of 8 years old boy who were questioned by police for saying “I am not Charlie and I am with terrorists” (The Independent, 01.02.2015). The interrogation of the boy and his father for apologizing terrorism can be considered as the reaction of French society towards terrorist attacks in Paris which resulted killing of 17 people.

In the wake terrorist attacks Dieudonne M’Bala M’bala, a controversial stand-up comedian, who posted “I feel like Charlie Coulibaly” message on his Facebook page, had to pay $37,000 fine for condoning terrorism (National Public Radio, 10.02.2015). Moreover, anti-Semitism in France, where totally 500,000
Jewish people live and this number constitutes the third country after Israel and United States, has increased over time. More than 7,000 Jewish people have left France for Israel in 2014, which composed almost double the total from the previous year (Spiegel, 29.01.2015). It is obvious that the violent responses failed to promote social and political changes on behalf of Muslim immigrants and resulted in various reactions, which have negatively affected Muslims who are even opposed to such violent actions. Additionally, violent actions have led to negative impact over Muslim immigrants and citizens as well as natives thereby leading to harm intergroup relations, which may increase the risk of future violence.

CONCLUSION

The blossoming impact of nonviolent actions in this century has been more salient than before. Globalization, advance in new technologies, values, norms, and, more importantly, human rights, are considered to be paramount factors to promote the mobilization of human beings. As understood from both cases, nonviolent actions can be triggered by established tools, including laws and structural policies, or some provocative initiatives, which are discussed above.

Though both cases are different in nature, there are some considerable similarities including group profile, aim, and targets. Both cases are about immigrants who seek to enjoy political and economic rights, and who target the state and state institutions. However, there are also some differences between the two cases, in terms of using nonviolent strategies, including, mass mobilization, media coverage, and commitment to nonviolent principles.

In this respect, as seen from both cases that are discussed in this paper, nonviolent actions can work out solutions if they are used strategically. The violent oriented actions, such as Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015 and 2005 riots in France, are less effective and unlikely to result in positive social and political changes. However, nonviolent actions observed in the case of Danish cartoon crisis may change or challenge the process on behalf of immigrants’ desire goals.

Europe has immigrants from different origins including religion, culture, ethnicity, political and social backgrounds and so on. The challenge that Europe is facing is to include all these differences and integrate them into society. If the European countries did not seek to produce solutions for the problems of immigrants and integrate them into political structure, the tensions among immigrant societies would always exist in Europe. In order to achieve these aims, the policymakers in Europe should prioritize comprehensive policies towards their target countries through preventing polarization and racism and encourage non-violent actions of immigrants through giving them social and political rights and opportunities.

Another conclusion can be inferred from the present study is that nonviolent actions are more productive in terms of dealing with Islamophobia while violent actions can polarize the political opinion towards immigrant’s rights. Moreover, in order to deal with their main concerns, Muslim immigrants in Europe should use non-violent tactics while addressing their problems and fighting against extremism and radicalism. Last but not least, since 2005, 10 years after the occurrence of riots in French, the present study has also showed that violent actions cannot produce social and political changes in favor of immigrants thereby resulting restrictive immigration policies and polarization rather than liberal immigration policies and inclusion of immigrants into the society.

REFERENCES


