Politics of Religious and Ethnic Identity the Cases of Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines

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Abstract

The situation in southern Thailand and southern Philippines is so complex that one can easily lose sight of what is the real problem. This article seek to address the complexity of the intertwined religious and ethnic identities of the southern Thai Muslims and the Moros; and how they have affect the nature of the separation movements in both regions. This article also show the similarities and differences in the two regions; and points a way out if possible from the situation, armed with better understanding of what are the real issues.

Key Words: Politics of Religious, Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines

Introduction

The situation in southern Thailand and southern Philippines is so complex that one can easily lose sight of what is the real problem. Much has been reported and equally much was confused. Dictaan-Bang-oa, E. (2004: 168-169) has pointed out that “a content analysis of the news accounts about the Mindanao crisis during the late 1990s to the early 2000s reveal that the media has contributed to public ignorance of what is really happening in Mindanao by not providing an accurate depiction of the background and context of the conflict.” The same will hold true for reports about the insurgency in Pattani, Yala and Narithiwat in southern Thailand. It is this public ignorance that this article attempts to address primarily. It is of paramount importance for policy makers to form an accurate understanding of what actually happen otherwise, an effective solution will always be wanting. On the other hand, a comparison between the developments in southern Thailand and southern Philippines also reveal important truth about the conflict and conflict management where lesson can be drawn.

In order to answer the above questions, we will first take a brief tour through the history of both regions; and the emergence of separatist groups and their aims and strategies, to put us in the right course and perspective in our analysis. Without a solid understanding of the history and the politics of identity, one will be easily confused by what is happening today, and think that the parties' behaviour is unintelligible, if not fanatic. But a good understanding of the historical contexts and the politics of identity will make the conflicts look more “rational”.

History

We are used to the terms "secessionists" and "separatists" in articles and reports about the Thai Malay Muslims group. From the perspective of Bangkok government, the use of the term may be accurate. Just as pointed out by Suwannathat-Pian (2002: 10), every Thai constitution stresses the principle that Thailand “is one and indivisible”. However, for the Malay Muslims, they are merely "claiming back" the independence and sovereignty they once enjoyed under the old glorious Malay Kingdom of Pattani, which was once the cradle of Malay and Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia. (Suwannathat-Pian, 2002: 5; Rabasa & Chalk, 2001: 95)

According to Suwannathat-Pian (2002: 5-6):

During the early Bangkok period (1782-1851), the Malay Kingdom of Pattani suffered greatly from the aggressive policy conducted by Bangkok. It was first forced to officially recognize the stringent tributary relation with Bangkok, whereby each candidate for the throne of the Pattani sultanate required the consent and approval of the "Raja Maha Besar Benua Siam ". The dismemberment of the sultanate came at the close of King Rama I’s reign (17821809). It was the recalcitrant attitude of the Pattani ruler who set himself up as the rallying point against the
influence and political power of Bangkok that let to the division of the sultanate into 7 small principalities. These seven Malay principalities / the khaekjet hua-muang were transformed into an integral part of the Siamese Kingdom in 1896. By 1902 the whole transformation process was completed. Within five years, the Seven Malay Provinces were re-organized into three provinces of Pattani (Tani, Nongchick, and Yaring); Yala (Yala and Raman); and Bang-Nara i.e. Narathiwat (Sai and Legeh).

When it is set again this background can we still call the Thai Malay Muslims “Separatists”? For the Thai Malay Muslims, they are merely struggling against the Thai oppressors.

The same point can be made for southern Philippines. According to DictaanBang-oa (2004: 154): “historical records reveal the existence of independent sultanates in Southern Philippines that had their own economic and political relations with other countries like Borneo, China and Malaysia” (see also Magdalena, 2003: 3). The sultanate fiercely resisted the Spanish colonization; however, it was the American that was more successful in setting foot in Mindanao. The divide and rule policy of the Spanish and American colonizers had successfully divided the Islamized and unIslamized people of Mindanao untill today. The immigration of Luzon and Visayas settlers, on the other hand, have deprived the Moros of their own land (Dictaan-Bang-oa, 2004: 154). The later Manila government continues with the same policy. Gowing (1979: 210) points out that “Integration takes away the Moro religious and cultural identity; migration and resettlement programs take away their land - thus, Moros and Moroland become assimilated into the Philippine nation.” Therefore, for the Moros, they are only trying to regain autonomy over their own land.

However, the issue is more complex than the above historical account revealed. Over the years, other more complex issues are also involved, otherwise the problem will be more easily resolved as the Thai Malay Muslims and Filipino Moro Muslims come to term with the fact that history is difficult to be changed.

Religious, Ethnic; or Both?

The present writer has deliberately adopted the terms “Thai Malay Muslims” and “Filipino Moro Muslims” to indicate a more complex issue, i.e. the issues of identity.

1. Southern Thailand

The importance of the Malay identity in the struggle of the southern Thai Muslims can be clearly seen when we run through the Bangkok policies that cause opposition from the Thai Malay Muslims and the claims and objectives of various separatist groups and organisations. The more organised struggle of the Thai Malay Muslims begins in early 1900s. 1901 King Chulalongkorn decided to speed up the process of assimilation and centralise the administration of the southern provinces. This led to opposition from the Malay Raja of Pattani, Tengku Abdul Kadir, among a few others. However, this struggle was short lived and ended after Tengku Abdul Kadir was arrested and jailed, but released a few years later after he signed a guarantee to renounce politics (Harrish, 2006: 5) More periodic protests began after 1910 when the Bangkok government decided to emphasise more on Thai language, and the Thai Malay was forced to receive Thai language education. When the Primary School Act 1921 was passed, major rebellion was orchestrated by Tengku Abdul Kadir from Kelantan (Harrish, 2006: 6).

Monarchy in Thailand came to an end in 1932 and was followed by a short-lived democracy, which saw Malays obtaining seats in the National Assembly and Senate. In 1938 Thailand fell under military rule, which again tried to assimilate the Malay, but did not try to convert them to Buddhism (Harrish, 2006: 6).

During the Second World War, Bangkok government supported the Japanese, while the Malay under the leadership of the son of Tengku Abdul Kadir, Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen supported the British in Malaya (Harrish, 2006: 7).

The issues of History and identity were clearly shown in Tengku Abdul Jalal, another Malay leader's plea to the British to liberate the southern Thai provinces from Thai rule:

Pattani is really a Malay country, formerly ruled by Malay Rajas for generations, but has been Siam's dependency only since about fifty years ago. Now the Allied Nations ought to help the
return of this country to the Malays, so that they can have it united with other Malay countries in
the peninsula (qtd. in Harrish, 2006: 7)

More structured organisation was formed in the 1940s with increasing Malay nationalism and
dissatisfaction with the Thai authorities. The objectives and activities of these organisations clearly
showed the Malay identity.

GAMPAR (the Association of Malays of Greater Pattani) was formed in late 1940s, and its aims
were four-fold:

1. To unite all south Thailand Malays and their descendants who were now in Malaya;
2. To establish closer contact with their homes and relatives in the Thai Malay provinces and to
improve living standards and life there;
3. To cooperate with one another and help each other;
4. To improve education and revive Malay culture in Southern Thailand.

Harrish (2006: 8) commented that:

GAMPAR's objectives clearly advocated the Malay cause in the conflict by calling for the merger
of the southern provinces of Thailand with the Federation of Malaya. But this is not to say that
Islam did not play any role in GAMPAR's goals. Religious rhetoric was used to garner support
from Islamic countries like Indonesia and Pakistan as well as international organisations, like the
United Nations and Arab League. But no assistance materialised because the discrimination in
southern Thailand was not perceived to be against Muslims.

In the end of 1940s, Haji Sulong, a prominent Malay Muslims leadership also put forward
similar list of demands to the Bangkok government on behalf of the provinces of Yala, Pattani,
Narathiwat and Satun. These include a high rank official who is a Muslim born within one of the four
provinces, elected by the people of the four provinces and possessing full power to govern the four
provinces; 80% of the government officials must be locally born Muslims; and Malay language should be
used along with Thai language within government office. On the other hand, education in Malay medium
should be introduced in the parish schools (Harrish, 2006: 8). In the 1960s the Barisan Revolusi National
(BRN) was created and its objective was to merge the southern provinces into a pan-Malay state across
Southeast Asia. This ignited the Malay identity once again where, other Malays from other countries in
the region were called to be united. Interestingly, it tactically supported the Communist Party Malaya,
and this has caused its call for unity of the Malays rejected (Harrish, 2006: 9). BRN's willingness to be
associated with an atheist ideology really raises doubt on its religiosity.

Harrish (2006: 9-10) attributes the emergence of ethnic Malay identity to two factors: the growth
of Malay Nationalism in Southeast Asia and the oppressive Bangkok policies towards particularly Malay
language and education, which were viewed by the Malays as encroachment of their cultural domain.

The present writer submits that the above features of the struggle of the southern Thai Malay
Muslims, especially the strategy adopted by GAMPAR, persisted even till today, although its
ministrations may have changed, but the core struggle is still Malay ethnic identity, as opposed to
religious identity. However, the Malays ethnic identity and religious identity have become more complex,
and inseparable.

The later development will show what the present writer mean. So far, the present writer has
followed Harrish’s (2005; 2006) analysis and will continue to do so in this article. However, the present
writer disagrees with him on the key point. Harrish believes that the religious identity of the southern
Malay Muslims has gain more prominent in their cause, but the present writer believes the Malay identity
is still the core, but it is projected differently. The different is fine but significant.

Harrish (2006: 10) argues that the religious Islamic identity of the southern Thai Malay Muslims
began to emerge in the 1970s as a new rallying point for the insurgents of their struggles. This can be
seen in the objectives of some of the new organisations formed.

Islam was part of the policy of the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP) to exploit the
support of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Arab League. However, this did not materialise
and BNPP faded away. The objectives of the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) also show
more emphasis on Islam. This is shown clearly in their often manipulated the identity of the victims of government oppression as Muslim instead of Malay, and their actions which often have religious connotations. It is clear that PULO intends to make religion "the primary driver of the conflict (Harrish, 2006: 13). In 1995 the New PULO emerged as a dissident faction of PULO. Their difference is mainly in strategic outlooks. However, in mid 1997 they cooperated in their operation under the name Bersatu to refocus their national and regional attention (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001:96).

On the other hand, leaders of the pondok religious schools are more involved in the struggle due to unfavourable government policies against the pondok (Harrish, 2006: 11). BRN Coordinate a splinter group of BRN has worked towards garnering support through the pondok (Harrish, 2006: 14).

Thus Harrish (2006: 14) comments that:

With the rise of groups like PULO and GMIP, the religious nature of the conflict in southern Thailand has become more prominent. The strife is increasingly portrayed as one between Buddhists and Muslims. The violence in the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiawat is less a 'Malay' predicament and more a 'Muslim' problem

Harrish (2006: 15-16) continues to attribute the change to four key factors:

1. The Bangkok government’s policies to suppress the Malay identity, by grouping them together with other Muslims as "Thai Muslims”;

2. The lack of support from Malaysia causes the southern Thai Malay Muslims to look elsewhere for their co-religionists rather than their co-ethnics for help;

3. Students who pursue higher Islamic education in the Middle East also amplified the religious identity of the younger generation in southern Thailand.

4. Post-September I I environment and the fear of global terrorism have added more religious colour to the local southern Thailand conflicts. (see also Smith, 2004: 2)

While the present writer agrees with Harrish on the increased prominence of the religious identity in the conflict, the present writer believes, as with other writers the core of the struggle is still ethnic in nature. “The presence of JI (Jemaah Islamiah) in Thailand and the documented regional cooperation among Southeast Asia’s terrorist groups are indicator that contact with international groups is possible or even likely” (Dillion, 2005). However, Lyons (2006) points out that the Jemaah Islamiah, fighting for an Islamic ‘superstate’ in Southeast Asia is rebuffed by the Thai Malay Muslims, besides there is no published link between the insurgency and international terrorism (Dillion, 2005). The Thai Malay Muslims refuse to internationalise their struggle (see also Evan, 2004; Liow, 2006: 49; Muslims Insurgencies, 2006) points out that the objective of the separatist groups remain political and local. “In Thailand the mobilisation of Islam has taken place within an insular and exclusive ethnic context where the identities of “Malay” and “Muslim” are intimately entwined, drawing attention to the importance of religion as a key marker of Malay ethnic identity” (Liow, 2006: 50). An understanding of the “entwined” Malay and Muslim identity of the Malay Muslim is of paramount importance in understanding the struggle of the ‘Thai Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. Without such understanding one will fall into the kind of confusion alluded at the beginning of this article. Take for example “it was a widespread belief, still is in some quarters, among the Muslim villagers that Malay was not just the mother tongue but it was the language of the Islamic religion. To learn Thai would amount to abandoning the faith and thus the Muslim identity to the damnation of one's soul” (Suwannathat-Pian, 2002: 14).

On the other hand, however the colour of the historical factor of the old glorious Pattani has faded in the struggle in southern Thailand; and the development and social justice. The symptoms of being second class citizen are “poverty, lack of development money when compared to other parts of the country, limited access to government jobs, and few education opportunities” (Dillion, 2005; see also Suwannathat-Pian, 2002:19-22). Kobkua points out that the situation in southern Thailand was calm from 1980s to 1990s (qtd. in Habib, 2006). It turns violent 2 years ago, mainly due to the heavy-handed methods and harsh rhetoric of the Thaksin administration in handling the problems in the southern provinces (Sheridan, 2006), besides doing very little for them (Habib, 2006). The lack of mutual trust
between the Bangkok government and the Thai Malay Muslims is another challenge to the management of situation in southern Thailand (Suwannathat-Pian, 2002: 22-27).

The fact that the recent coup leader, General Sonthi Boonyaratghn, who is trusted by the King, is a Muslim, speaks a lot about the situation in Thailand. It may be a telling point to show that the conflict in southern Thailand is a conflict between the ‘Malays’ and the ‘Thais’ rather than ‘Muslims’ and ‘Buddhist’.

2. Southern Philippines

The formation of identity in southern Philippines among the Bangsa Moro is even more complex and more interesting than the Thai Malay Muslims. In fact the 3.5 million Muslim in southern Philippines are not from a homogeneous ethnic group as in southern Thailand. They consist of three major and ten minor ethno-linguistic groups and disperse across the southern islands (McKenna, 2006: 1; Lingga, 2004: 2). McKenna (2006: 2) points out that:

The Spaniards assigned to the unsubjugated Muslim people of the southern sultanates the label previously bestowed on their familiar Muslim enemies from Mauritania and Morocco, “Moros” (Moors). The term “Moro” was applied categorically and pejoratively with scant attention paid to linguistic or political distinction among various “Moro” societies. The American colonizers who succeeded the Spaniards and eventually subdued Philippine Muslims in the early twentieth century by means of overwhelming force, continued the usage of “Moro” even though it had become an epithet among Christian Filipinos, denoting savages and pirates. In a bold semantic shift, Philippine Muslims separatists during the late 1960s appropriated the term “Moro” and transformed it into a positive symbol of collective identity—one that denominated the citizens of their imagined nation.

Therefore, the Bangsa moro identity is a recent creation. While Islam is intertwined into the Malay identity and acting as a ministration of the Malay identity in Southern Thailand; what the Moros have in common is Islam, thus Islam is cement of the Bangsa Moro identity. Unlike in southern Thailand the Moros only constitute about 20% of Mindanao population, although they are still the majority in the five provinces under the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (Magdalena, 2003: 9).

The identity politics in southern Philippines exhibits a different pattern from the southern Thailand. In southern Thailand the direct conflicts about identity, linguistic, educational, religious issues are the core conflicts. However, in southern Philippines the issue of identity and the issue of land mixed together. This point can be demonstrated by referring to the conflict between the Manila government and the Moros arise. Saha-Anand (2002, 3) points out that:

Although both cases are armed conflicts between large Muslim minorities and the non-Muslim states where religious justifications and histories of colonization by the centers certainly play significant roles in keeping deadly conflicts alive, main factors underlying these two cases of armed conflicts are different. I would argue that conflict in Mindanao could also be framed as a conflict arising from opposing systems of land use practices. In traditional Moro view, based on customary law and Islam, land inherited by the community and held in trust by the chief. During the first decade of the last century, with massive influx of settlers from Northern and Central Philippines into communal Moro lands, the Moro became more alienated.

The resulting poverty from the alienation was viewed by the Manila government as a result of cultural inferiority rather than unfair treatment. As further action, the government pursued an “integration” policy, which in fact was assimilation policy (McKenna, 2006: 7). The policy had given rise to armed resistance from the Moros. So, here we see a chain of transformations conflict from conflict about immigration of the Christians, to the conflicts about land use, to the conflicts about cultural assimilation and to the identity politics familiar to us today.

There are mainly three separatist groups operating in southern Philippines, i.e. the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf group. MNLF was form in 1971 as an underground organisation by Nur Misuri. After President Marcos declared martial law in 1972 the group began an armed separatist insurgency against the government
In 1976 MNLF and the government entered into the Tripoli Agreement in a conference sponsored by the OIC and Libya. McKenna (2006: 11) comments that:

The terms of the agreement were also quite favourable to MNLF demands. The cease-fire went into effect in late January, 1977 and was generally successful for about nine months. Talks begun in February on the implementation of the peace settlement, and very soon broke down over widely divergent interpretations of the key terms of the agreement. Marcos then proceeded to "implement" the Tripoli Agreement on his own terms, principally by creating two special "autonomous" regions, one for central Mindanao and the other for Sulu. In retrospect it seems clear that President Marcos never sincerely intended to implement the agreement as signed.

The failure of the Tripoli Agreement speed up a split in MNLF and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed (McKenna, 2006: 11). This mark the beginning of a more religious oriented struggle by the Moros. In 1990 a new Muslim autonomous region was established (McKenna, 2006: 13). Series of negotiation was held again between 1993 to 1996. In 1996 an agreement was reached to implement the original Tripoli Agreement in two phases. In the first phase the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) under the leadership of Nur Misuari, the former MNLF chairman, was created. He went on to win the election as Governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslims Mindanao (ARNIM). SPCPD's role was to supervise the implementation of the agreement during a three-year trial period.

The second phase, which was supposed to begin in 1999, will see the establishment of a new Regional Autonomous Government with its own executive council, a legislative assembly, and representation in the national government. "It would also have tax raising powers, a regional security force, an educational system that would incorporate the madaris (Islamic schools), and a system of Shariah (Islamic) courts” (McKenna, 2006: 15-16) However, the second phase was never implemented after the deadline in 1999, for two reasons. First, limited authority and support given to the SPCPD making it ineffective in its goals. Secondly, the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf groups continue to clash with the government as they are not parties to the 1996 Agreement (McKenna, 2006: 16).

MILF signed a cease-fire agreement with the government in 1997, and entered into peace talk with the government. However, the negotiation went very slowly, and since late 1999 fighting was intensified and in 2000 the MILF withdrew from the peace talk (McKenna, 2006: 16). In 2001, peace talk resumed in Kuala Lumpur, resulting the Kuala Lumpur Agreement.

One has to differentiate the MILF from the Abu Sayyaf although both invoke religious tenants in their fight. The MIELF is a rebel group who only fight with the government military units, while the Abu Sayyaf is engaging in killings and kidnappings (terrorist tactics), and the Abu Sayyaf s activities are never approved by the MELF (McKenna, 2006: 16). Although the Abu Sayyaf’s activities have gained much publicities, the MILF remain the main group and the group that is much supported by the people that is fighting with the government. Therefore, as points out by Liow (2006: 49&53) the objective of the fight remain local; although religious symbolism and Islamic dialectics, idioms and metaphors are increasingly employed and mobilised to articulate their struggle, but their objective do not fit well with the global jihadi ideology. Nevertheless, Islam is becoming increasingly critical to the harmonization of the differences within the Muslim communities in Mindanao that have traditionally been split along feudal and ethnic lines as well as across religious boundaries (Liow, 2006: 51).

However, it is significant that both the Christian and Muslim constituencies, through the Bishops and Ulama Forum, issued a call for cessation of hostilities clarifying that the war in Mindanao is not a religious war between the Christians and the Muslims, but a war between the Philippine military and the MILF (Dictaan-Bang-oa, 2004: 159)

In conclusion, by marginalizing Philippine Muslims in their own homeland through massive government-sponsored in-migration, the government created a relatively impoverished regional minority resentful of the benefits provided to Christian migrants and highly suspicious of government motives.
(McKenna, 2006: 19). Therefore, we can claim that the identity politics in southern Philippines is partly a byproduct of the alienation of the local people from their homeland.

**Conclusion and Prospect**

Gowing (1979: 202-204) raises the issues of the dichotomy between *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*, and commented that the many issues which the Moros raise with the Manila government should be seen in this light. He also mentions the concept of *dar al-Aman*, the “Abode of Trust” in the Moro Islam. Generally, Muslim jurists divide the world into *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-kuftlharb*. *Dar al-Islam* can be briefly defined as an Islamic state where Islamic principles are implemented in every aspect of Muslims' life. *Dar al-kufr* is the land of unbelief but not hostile, while *dar al-harb* is the land of war against Islam (Masud, 1989). Of course the definitions of these concepts are more complex than what is offered here. But it is enough for our purpose here to generally understand that *dar al-Islam* is an Islamic state and *dar al-kuftlharb* is not. Traditionally, it is generally the view of Muslim jurists that a Muslim is obligated to migrate to a *dar al-Islam* unless he has absolutely no means to do so (Masud, 1989: 118-119). However, he points out that there may be other options for the Muslims living in non-Muslim polities.

Masud (1989) proposes are the Pre-hijrah Makkah model, Post-hijrah Makkah model and Abyssinia and Hudaybiyyah model. In the Pre-hijrah Makkah model, there was no established *dar al-Islam* yet, therefore, there is no question of Muslim migrating out of Makkah. But it is the duty of Muslim to struggle to established *dar al-Islam* in Makkah. In the Post-hijrah Makkah model, *dar al-Islam* has been established in Madinah, it is than the duty of Muslims to migrate to Madinah to support jihad of *dar al-Islam* against *dar al-harb*. However, there is the third model of Abyssinia/Hudaybiyyah, in which Muslims stay in *dar al-harb* as if staying in *dar al-Islam*. The difference between Abyssinia and Hudaybiyyah is that Abyssinia was already ruled by non-Muslims before the Muslims arrived there, but Hudaybiyyah was originally *dar al-Islam*, but was later colonized by non-Muslims.

The situation of the Thai Malay Muslims and the Moros fit well into the Hudaybiyyah model. Both Patani kingdom and Mindanao were once an independent Muslim kingdom, but were arbitrarily drawn into the territory of the non-Muslim power. According to the Abyssinia/Hudaybiyyah model, Muslims living therein had to express their identity by public observance of religious duties; freedom of religion was guaranteed to them.

Historically there were periods in which the right to express their religious identity were not granted to Thai Malay Muslims in the southern Thailand and the *Moros* in southern Philippines. But we have also seen that the Bangkok government until recently under the Thaksin administration has increasingly recognised the rights of the minorities groups in Thailand, including the Muslims' rights. The Malay language has been reintroduced into government schools. Even political representation of the Thai Malay Muslims has improved (Jory, 2002). On the other hand, the Manila government is at least willing to negotiate, and some progress has been made. At least the ARMM was created.

However, Gowing (1979: 226) also comments that the most reasonable hope of truly incorporating the *Moros* into Philippine national community lies in the direction of altering the present unitary structure of the Philippine Republic. It may also be the case for Thailand. Perhaps the Malaysian federal system, which places certain matters such as land administration and religious affair under state control, which has been proven successful, may be a good reference. Nevertheless, further research is necessary.

**Bibliography**


