FOUCAULT ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF POWER MECHANISMS: SOME APPRAISALS ON PEDAGOGY AND SEX

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Abstract
Michel Foucault cautions, especially in *Discipline and Punish* and *the History of Sexuality*, that in the modern demonstrations of power, the mechanisms of disciplinarity become intolerable when drawn nearer to social injustices. The metaphorical background that can contextualize this is a life of theogonic myth and the herd à la Nietzsche, among others. The human within such frame is exposed to various forms of power dominance from racial intolerance, social prejudices, to the alienating prospects of capitalistic elites and socio-political eccentricities of power relations. Amid the contemporariness of converging and overlapping modes of power handling, this paper appraises the question of human agency to examine how much of agency is undermined. With the threat to agency in mind, the paper attempts to further appraise the mechanisms of pedagogy and sex in particular by exposing them within the ambiguous ambit of modern power play.

Keywords: Foucault, Disciplinarity, Sexuality, Power, Mechanisms, Pedagogy.

1. PREAMBLE OF A MYTHICAL HERD: METAPHORS OF MODERN POWER
Nietzsche says in the *Homerica Contest* (1976a): ‘what kind of earthly existence do these revolting, terrible theogonic myths reflect? A life ruled only by the children of Night: strife, lust, deceit, old age, and death’ (p. 34). This power of mythic origin finds similar sovereignty in the opening lines of Michel Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* (1979a), where a showcase of an unfortunate existence awaits for the governed: On 2 March 1757, Damiens the regicide was condemned to ‘make the amende honorable before the main door of the Church of Paris’, where he was to be taken and conveyed in a cart, wearing nothing, but a shirt, holding a torch of burning wax weighing two pounds; then, ‘in the said cart, to the Place de Greve, where, on a scaffold, that will be erected there, the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs, and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he committed the said parricide, burnt with sulphur, and, on those places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and sulphur melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds.’ (*Pieces originales…*, 372-4)

The tremendous punishment accorded to Damiens’ treacherous attempt to kill the king has reminded him of three important words: *thou shall not*. This is read, for example, in every quasi-ancient-rubbish-painted tablets in churches, labeled as the ten commandments with more than half of them inscribed in the beginning with ‘thou shall not *-*, ‘kill, covet, steal, lie!’; which means precisely that after laying the foundation of ‘thou shall-’ in God, ‘to be generally loved wholly, and particularly by name and Sabbath,’ all else is attributed to the level of Justice – the sins against justice – to the society, and to the inscription that after the law towards God must be the law towards the people. Any attempt whatsoever to abolish the law of the king seeks to enrage and shake the law of the people. But while the event was trying to acquaint first the prologue of the genealogy of discipline and punish as a representation of medieval torture, such a picture cautions normal non-decadent, average folks not to touch even a little piece of cloth in the cloak of the king, which is boldly embroidered with the texts *Noli me tangere* (as allegory to St. John’s gospel, *touch me not*). The king has a word and it shall not be refused or neglected by the servant (the whole history of domestication since primitive to feudal to caste-systems to the bourgeois etc.), which disheartens his ability to rise up and create anew. That is to say, the sovereign power of the king is in itself “thou shall not.” In effect, ordinary people, governed by the city-walls of laws and a whole set of caricature of rules, struggle to

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live in a docile yet seditious spirit, and yearns to find blood, that is, to find life again from the false freedom allotted by this ideology.

People who lived in such sovereign laws and ‘thou shall not’ struggle in the incommensurability of their legal values. Metaphorically speaking, it is as if the laws themselves rooted and covered the light away from them: the shadows figuratively roamed like filthy Cerberuses, waiting for a suicidal attempt of a soul’s escape, surreptitiously guarding the cave. The imagery is likewise reminiscent of Plato’s cave of ignorance, doubt, and disillusionment. Within such imagery, there is much brokering for illusions. There is much brokering for fantasy- formations.

The king’s gaze, which is the gaze of hegemonic power, as opposed to the Foucauldian disciplinary panopticon, paralyzes the working class and the governed. In other words, the king has deprived the ordinary people of living in reality because of too many constraints. The question in this paper delves more into the question of finding the extent of human agency left amid this kind of sovereignty.

On the one hand, a number of attempts to transgress one’s paralyzing social environs are seen in some philosophers. From a Christian socio-political context, Kierkegaard, for his part, went for a leap of faith. From the imitative and corruptible nature of physical reality, Platonists (and consequently, the Neo-Platonists) expound further on the world of forms. With the restlessness of the negative, Hegel philosophizes on a spiral movement in the Geist. And inconsistently, within a messy authoritarian crisis of politics, the later Heidegger propped towards the Nazi party for some anti-Semitic leanings.

On the other hand, Dawkin’s point can well shed light on the domesticking effect of sovereign power (cf. Dawkins, 2009). He traces, for instance, the evolutionary discontinuity of wolves that came to eventually evolve into dogs. With some biological tracing of genetic compositions, it is postulated that dogs’ origins are wild wolves – only that they were hunted, tamed, domesticated, injected with vaccines; hence, deprived of their wild nature. In the same manner, the tamed nature of the uncreative slaves (but creative in daydreaming), of the people at the mercy of the sovereign, lacks nothing but action. In this sense, life becomes a myth, which in Nietzsche’s words is a theogonic myth: gone by the isms of some otherworldly divine sovereign power. Living in a life of illusion is tantamount to nothingness - “A life ruled only by the children of Night: strife, lust, deceit, old age, and death.” To base an analogy from Camus’ Myth of Sisyphus (1965), a theogonic mythical life is an absurd endless rolling over up and down of a rock from the plain to the hill and vice-versa. This incidentally retells Dante’s Canto XVIII (2004, p. 107; 109) which pictures the fourth terrace of the island of purgatory where the slothful are made to run endlessly, restlessly pointless:

Two of the penitents run ahead of their main pose, babbling. The words are about Mary rushing to a mountain and Caesar rushing back and forth across the Continent to make war. Following them, the others cried: “Quick, quick, lest time be lost through insufficient love; where urge for good is keen, grace finds new green.”

“O people in whom eager fervor now may compensate for sloth and negligence you showed in doing good half-heartedly, he- who’s alive, and surely I don’t lie to you – would climb above as soon as he has seen the sun shed light on us again.

The interposed problem of the structure of laws and customs has formed in man an incapacity to make much of human intervention. But such ideologies and customary ways of living cannot be easily done away with, since in one way or another, they have been rooted in social constructs, in cultural settings for example, in an inevitable sign of human locus. Yet the improvisation and the effectivity accorded to them cannot be easily undermined by being passive with the structure, since the structure in a sense is a collectivity of different patterns of behavioral passages and communitarian groups. Put together in acts of assembly, passive and austere people living together can altogether form the herd: “No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse” (Nietzsche, 1976c).

Under this heading, the herd revolves around pseudo-honor as opposed to active virtue as honorable (Aquinas, 1993). In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the herd counteracts the real meaning of virtue as activity when it focuses on mediocrity and sleep (Kahambing, 2018a). The image of being filled with valor makes one an agent, however, but of illusion. In keeping with one another, in making peace, the herd petty moralizes and becomes fed-up with adventures, new things, and new roots (so they pay homage to old roots), and abolishes the formation of the necessary conflicts of life. Against the life of creatio where man is a part of creation and has to take part in the efficiency of creation (Aquinas, ST I-I Q.44-46), the herd lives in inactivity, behind structured walls, behind the ideologies that can either make or break them. In this position together, the herd goes hand-in-hand in the disposition of lethargy.
In the structure of sovereignty, and with the prospect of a pseudo-world of forms, the individual tries to yield, to reach and emulate, thinking that he himself must be sovereign too. In so doing, the individual detaches himself from the others to make of himself more than the herd. But the fact that they are one herd does make them one with each other: one in rising and one in going down (there are no exceptions as one is gazed by the envy and insecurity of crab mentality).

In a sovereign power, much as Hobbes’ Leviathan, the herd operates like wolves clashing each other for the sake of survival or less competition and are then tamed to be dogs, so much so that “in Hobbes’s mind the function of the state was to curb the fear that individuals have of one another, to curb the human tendencies so that a reasonable working arrangement could be achieved. The motive in the Hobbesian state, however, is pure self-interest” (Connel, 1987, p. 132). Hence, in order to preserve the herd from too much incompatible self-interests, which harm the herd by the will to contend (Thivet, 2008, p. 704), the prima facie solution is to tame and deprive them of any chance to rebel so as not to make a concern out of their survival instincts. In this sense, they have created an image of peace that is devoid of any conflict, not even fraternal correction. In order to make a society of mundane pacifism, Adam Smith’s (1776) words resound: “give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of.” In the same vein, Nietzsche (1976b) says,

Insofar as the individual wants to preserve himself against other individuals, in a natural state of affairs he employs the intellect mostly for simulation alone. But because man, out of need and boredom, wants to exist socially, herd-fashion, he requires a peace pact and he endeavors to banish at least the very crudest bellum omnium contra omnes (war of all against all) from his world (p. 44).

By then, it is easily established that human agency in such a case as a sovereign state disables itself to act upon works such as creativity and productivity and instead is domesticated by amiability and false-docility. Particularly then, he notes that there is a caution from Foucault on this matter. But specifically, he highlights the warning to the unjust demonstrations made by the tools of disciplinarity when handled by a sovereign power. To quote at length:

Foucault, in Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality I, demonstrates that when the tools of disciplinarity (which emerged in the confluence of historical discontinuities relating to geometric demographic expansion, global explorations resulting in the adventures of empire, the reconfiguration of international financial & mercantile apparatuses, etc.) are brought into proximity to social prejudices, racial intolerance, petty moralizing, the fantasy-driven agendas of the bourgeoisie, the hyper-production of social & political aberrations such as the penitentiary apparatus, the social-science medical-establishment-driven deployments of sexuality, disguised as legitimate science in service of public interest, when in fact they operate as little more than pernicious multipliers of personal dissatisfaction, social paralysis, unconscionable human suffering – that he would like to get us to understand is intolerable (David, 2013).

The intolerable mechanism of power are modes of producing human subjects with docile bodies. Following from these modes, it is important to take note that there are two types of power in Foucault to understand the point of ambiguity. There is a guiding ambivalence in the explication of Foucault’s two types of power. On the one hand, Covaleske expounds sovereign power in its conspicuous form. Says Covaleskie (2003), As Foucault describes in the first part of Discipline and Punish, sovereign power is that form expressed in recognizable ways through particular and identifiable individuals. The “nodes” of this form of power are the king, the prince, and the agents thereof. These individuals are visible agents of power, known by others and by themselves to be such. Sovereign power is also typified by the intermittency with which it is exercised. It assesses taxes, enforces the law by exacting penalties for violations thereof, raises armies in time of war, and so on. But each of these cases where sovereign power flexes is discrete; it acts in
response to a certain set of circumstances and through a specific and identifiable agent or set of agents. When sovereign power operates, we know that we have been acted upon, in what ways, and by whom. The complement to this is the understanding that most of one’s life is beyond the control of the sovereign (Italics mine).

As such, sovereign power is blunt, highly visible, and operates in a strong position of legal authority. With the demographic expansion and global explorations of imperialism, coupled with transnational and multinational economic increase, sovereign power penetrates into the mechanisms of socio-political legalities. And it does this in a visible way that there is massive awareness and influence. In effect, this type of governance acquires a totalizing function that the domains of social life become subject to surveillance. A great deal of transgression happens when this sovereign mechanism passes in the appearance of disciplinary power, taking note that there is only a thin line that stands in between these two. This is because disciplinary power, on the other hand, functions in a quotidian practice as ‘the power exercised by those who represent the sovereign authority in everyday transactions by their own or the sovereign's rules.’ Says Covaleskie (2013),

First of all, the disciplinary society controls not through the direct application of power by the sovereign or his agent, but through an impersonal and invisible gaze. The efficiency of disciplinary power is closely related to its invisibility compared with the visible sovereign. For disciplinary power to be effective, it is the subject, not the power, which must be seen. This relationship of visibility and invisibility is reciprocal; for the subject to be disciplined, it must be visible, at least potentially, to the disciplinary gaze, and know itself to be; at the same time, the gaze must actually be invisible so that it is effective even when it is not actually turned on an individual. Its totalizing power lies precisely in its universal potentiality, combined with the impossibility of verifiability.

There is also, therefore, a totalizing power of disciplinary power but this remains hidden in the subject and its quotidian social environs. Most of modern society’s apparatuses are operated close to daily life. The concrete exemplification of this is found in modern establishments: hospitals, schools, prisons, and other institutions. They impose a disciplinary mode of production that shapes its subjects according to its rule. In the case of hospitals, patients with their regular food and practice regimens. In the case of schools, the molding character of education. In the case of prisons, the hourly observance of rules. The discourses of such guides are oftentimes mired by the rhetoric of common good, public interest, and so on. But it is difficult to detect whether power is either sovereign or disciplinary since the point of ambiguity is sparsely mitigated by thin layers of transgressing perspectives. Like the panopticon, which Foucault borrowed from Bentham, the gaze of the penitentiary system could very much ascertain disciplinary power, but it also qualifies as a sovereign mode of subjecting individuals under its gaze, dependent on the point of view of power. Juxtaposing the two, continues Covaleskie (2013),

It is more difficult to ascertain the precise nature of disciplinary power since one of its distinguishing features is the swiftness and lightness with which it acts, thus rendering it substantially less visible than sovereign power. Briefly, we can state three differences: (1) sovereign power operates through specific visible agents; disciplinary power is diffuse in its operation, coming from everywhere and acting on everyone; (2) because of its visibility, sovereign power is susceptible to resistance, while disciplinary power, invisible and all-pervasive, is difficult to locate, and therefore difficult to resist; and (3) while sovereign power affects only a small portion of an individual’s life, disciplinary power affects virtually all aspects of living, subjecting everyone to the possibility of surveillance at all times.

When drawn nearer to social injustices, both powers are susceptible to abuse. One can, in other words, impose one’s sovereign power under the pretext of discipline. Recall, in this sense, a sadistic teacher who punishes his/her students harshly but legitimizes this practice in the guise of disciplining them. Under this aegis of power, ethnic cleansings, genocides, extra-judicial killings, and the like are impositions of a sovereign that are widely conspicuous and blatant to all. The makings of ideological subjects under capitalistic settings, moreover, dampen the need to discuss the perspectival discourses that produce such practices. Social apparatuses, along with economic motives, become agents of the sovereign but in the mask of discipline.

One of the key difference between the two is the assertion that sovereign power is “susceptible to resistance,” which means that its direct interplay of commands enforce a clear set of protocols. In this sense, it is easier to rebel as this type of power can be paralleled to Žižek’s account of symbolic power (1991, p. 250)
where one trusts the king but only within its symbolic function while maintaining a resisting posture. Hence, even with discernable difference, there are still paradoxes and points of ambiguity in understanding sovereign and disciplinary power. In it in these two modes of viewing power that pedagogy and sex come about as power mechanisms to be appraised further.

3. PEDAGOGY AND SEX AS POWER MECHANISMS

Foucault resists over-arching ideologies that abuse power towards others, towards human agency itself and he tells this directly without being affected by social constraints. His words directly concern the point: “I am no doubt, not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write” (Theile, 1991). Foucault's approach to the constitution of the subject within a historical framework is also based on the rejection of the 'grand recit' (cf. Lyotard, 1984). He resists the drive to express an overarching theory of power or knowledge that puts everything in place with military precision. Instead, Foucault's genealogies “analyze the specificity of mechanisms of power-knowledge relations by tracing the network of relationships which provides the conditions for the formation of specific orders, identities, and knowledge” (Lacombe, 1996, p. 349).

By phasing a society of slaves, modernity shapes a society of subjects – whose subjectivity is bound by oppression, anti-liberal movements, and fantasy-driven passivity of actions, incurable sickness of sexual polity, and the abuse of the structures upon them – unable to respond to their natural stimuli but only to the misconstrued point of departure in the name of legitimized features. The mythical herd, the false society tied with the pleasures of phantasmagorical emancipation, produces a strain in the social ethos through its loopholes. Like unconnected waste management programs, the sovereign leaves behind tons of undermined wastes in their power management when the subjects are left for nothing. There are then cases of abuse in the use of the legitimization of mechanisms by the higher class, which was made in the first place for their own natural consumption. Capitalism, for example, is an ideology coated with self-direction and equal opportunities for the slaves but only for them to be self-directed and equalized by the sovereign (recall here how yoga and other meditative practices help capitalism by making the system run smooth). Such a case demands the proper use of mechanisms accorded for an individual in society. All these innovations (“geometric demographic expansion, global explorations resulting in the adventures of empire, the reconfiguration of international financial & mercantile apparatuses, etc.”) are made to be in the guise of static relationships, the fixed gestures of the modern domain in order to accumulate more power at the expense of unforeseen consequences for the governed.

This then leads to “proximity to social prejudices, racial intolerance, petty moralizing, the fantasy-driven agendas of the bourgeoisie, the hyper-production of social & political aberrations such as the penitentiary apparatus, the social-science medical-establishment-driven deployments of sexuality, disguised as legitimate science in service of public interest, when in fact they operate as little more than pernicious multipliers of personal dissatisfaction, social paralysis, unconscionable human suffering.” All of these are intolerable as Foucault demonstrates much that he uses genealogies to spot the prevailing differences. In 1977, Foucault best explained genealogy in an article entitled ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.’ The purpose of genealogy, he tells us, is not to trace origins, not to find continuities and provide pedigrees, but rather “to maintain events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us” (Phelan, 1990, p. 423).

In matters of pedagogy, the faulty appraisal in this point is the misuse of disciplinarity and the structured laws solely governed by a single truth that unified all succeeding interpretations – a source of perpetuated sovereign codes for the higher-ups. In the case of the petty moralizations of power, Foucault says that “truth is undoubtedly the sort of error that cannot be refuted because it has hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of history” (144). Truth is a concept that the genealogist rejects as a ‘truth,’ an essence; the genealogist looks at the formation of truths and of the systems of meaning which they presuppose (Phelan, 1990, p. 424).” This leads us to the core concern of power in the mechanisms of pedagogy:

Without the veil of truth as a simple presence, a thing prior to and independent of social systems, we see revealed the play of power. Here, we see the full development of the theme, found in his earlier work, of the dual nature of the modern subject. The modern subject is the subject rather than the object of knowledge, it is the knower rather than the known. However, with the advent of the human sciences, we also become the known, the subject we (subjects) study. Subjects are also the product of subjection, of particular domination. This
domination operates through language to structure all our other institutions and relations. Power, then, is not opposed to knowledge or truth, but functions through it and the systems of meaning upon which it rests. Power operates through discourses that define and legitimize its operation (Phelan, 1990).

Herein lies the epistemic nexus that ties moral injunctions in social fields in the pedagogical tools of modern power: “modern power is bound to knowledge in a special way. The modern age is the age of the free subject, and as such, it cannot admit of or legitimate a power that overtly dominates and controls. Thus modern power must operate in such a way as to prevent us from seeing it for what it is. It plays on the assumed opposition between truth and power by ‘producing a discourse, seemingly opposed to it but really a part of a larger deployment of modern power’” (cf. Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983).

In contemporary society, Foucault argues, power is not ‘juridical’ or an apparatus of thou shall not. Instead, it is a positive injunction that shapes the way we create ourselves as forms of self-understanding. The view that power must only be interpreted within the ambit of legalism is to situate again the network of power within the nihilistic strife of night as Nietzsche expresses. It is for this reason that he says that ‘we need to cut off the King’s head.’ There is a need to establish a politics that moves away from extreme legalism and sovereign power. One such move to support is to analyze carceral institutions as Foucault did: hospitals, asylums, prisons. The forms of power generated in these settings have spread to other locations, bypassing the law with its simple formula of prohibition and punishment. As such, one of the key takeaways in *Discipline and Punish* is to see the transition that occurred in penal institutions as form of shift towards humanistic, rehabilitative, and pedagogical training. Such rehabilitation, such as education, amounts to the production and normalization of subjects, and as such should be very suspicious to us. Foucault notes that “the discourses generated in these institutions move into all our relationships” (cf. Foucault, 1979b).

In the final analysis, these make us realize the importance of wielding such mechanism not to obliterate or dominate others but to move a generation to the future through pedagogical structures and cared-for selves aiming at a life with lifelong examinations in the interplay of power-relations. As a mode of pedagogical practice in discipline, “all three of these areas for further investigation — power relations, care for the self, and lifelong teaching — could be examined under Seneca’s precept: ‘men learn as they teach’” (Deacon, 2006, p. 186; cf. Foucault, 1977). In this light, “the educational process must affirmatively inculcate values into students and insofar as individual students are themselves vehicles of power and not merely objects of power” (Ely-Yamin, 1993, p. 666). This can be aptly called ‘dialectical pedagogy’ which “envisions power not as a solid mass that is applied, either by society or by the school, but rather as a constantly circulating liquid that is transmitted by human vehicles” (Foucault, 1980).

The care for the self is an important part of wielding the mechanisms such that the dictum ‘know thy self first before you relate with others’ prioritizes one’s drive when the latter only sees externalities that are nonetheless vital. One must start at his own artwork of the self. In humanizing a pedagogy for liberation, “we should hope that we enable students to engage in critical, open dialogue in relation to their own lives and others’ lives” (Long, 1995, p. 329). In the course of human resources management in the power-relations setting, “processes of individualization and individuation create an industrial subject who is analyzable and describable. As an approach, it allows HRM to be analyzed as the ‘will to knowledge,’ that is, as a system of knowledge and modality of power” (Townley, 1993, p. 524).

Taking into consideration the matters of aesthetic practice in pedagogy, one can abide in the ethical plea of Foucault: ‘from the idea that the self is not given to us, there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art (Foucault, 1984, p. 262).’ To do this, Foucault ‘distills the ethical into that rapport a soi or ‘relation of the self to itself’ that manifests itself as the ‘considered reflective’ practice of freedom,’ a practice always analytically distinct from the moral principles and codes to which it has a reference” (Faubion, 2001, p. 85).

In the realm of pedagogies along with the perversions of children’s sex, “not only is reflexivity important for those teaching about sexualities but also students can be encouraged to develop greater reflexivity themselves” (Baber & Murray, 2001 p. 31). We need to see that Foucault moves from discourse towards wielding the apparatuses rightly.

Moving towards matters of sexuality, Foucault “does not wish to deny that there were and are prohibitions and limitations on sexuality. What he hopes to suggest is that these prohibitions function within the larger ‘apparatus’ of sexuality, that they are not ‘the problem,’ but are simply what modern sexual discourse identifies as the issue” (Phelan, p. 422). As he directs his motive as regards the repression of the sexual discourse, Foucault (1979a) asserts:
The question I would like to pose is not, Why are we repressed? but rather, Why do we say, with so much passion and so much resentment... that we are repressed? By what spiral did we come to affirm that sex is negated? What led us to show, ostentatiously, that sex is something we hide, to say it is something we silence?

...I do not maintain that prohibition of sex is a ruse; but it is a ruse to make prohibition into the basic and constitutive element from which one would be able to write the history of what has been said concerning sex starting from the modern epoch.

We should move on from simple discourse towards analysis, or more particularly, to critical theorizing. And this follows from a certain conditional: “if the critical theorist is to take seriously the social and political dimensions of the emerging ‘informational revolution,’ then Foucault's distinctive approach to the inherent relation of discourse and power is likely to be a useful vehicle of analysis “ (White, 1986). Far from the importance of sex is the discourse of sex, which must be detached from its social constraints and taboo. A lot of modern constraints in society still bind it with intolerance and the domesticating influences that prohibit the open and multifaceted nuances of sex, sexuality, sex education, and liberation. Cases of same-sex marriages, homosexual adoptions, matters of gender movements and rights, have various intricacies that will cause in the end the bankruptcy of patriarchal, heterogeneous masks of control (cf. Kahambing, 2015).

Therefore, without totally abandoning the pluralism of contemporary society, what is important is that we take part in the ground, on the real historical framework, on the particularity accorded to individual selves. With this, Foucault differs from Habermas’ civic society. Says Flyvbjerg (1998),

From the perspective of the History of philosophy and political theory, the difference between Foucault and Habermas lies in the fact that Foucault works within a particularistic and contextualist tradition, with roots in Thucydides via Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Foucault is one of the more important twentieth-century exponents of this tradition. Habermas is the most prominent living exponent of a universalistic and theorizing tradition derived from Socrates and Plato, proceeding over Kant. In power terms, we are speaking of ‘strategic’ versus ‘constitution’ thinking, about struggle versus control, conflict versus consensus (p. 228).

As a rejoinder to the exposed problem of human agency, the function of mechanisms in disciplinarity and sexuality should be to focus more on cared-for selves, on mastering one’s self. The problem, however, is that the social sciences had produced too many add-ons on these selves, diverting our attention to mere externalities. If, before, one must be punished for the deed, at present, with the rise of various sciences, one has to be examined why one does the deed, how one does it, or how frequent, with whom, etc. And these are done, for instance, by the psychologist, the psychiatrist, the sex expert. The abusive problem in “the sociological problem of human agency is, according to Foucault, bound irrevocably to the ‘analytic of finitude’ associated with the human sciences and intertwined within the processes of coercive individualization brought on by disciplinary power” (Brenner, 1994; cf. Smart, 1982). This power had been fantasized by the bourgeoisie: “in reality, the sphere of the technical expert is subordinate to that of the true bureaucrat (bourgeoisie) whose administration derives from a presumption of power” (O’Niell, 1986, p. 57).

As such, there is a need to liberate ourselves for more productive living, be it in the realm of disciplinarity or in the realm sexuality – such mechanisms must be wielded correctly. For this correct use of power, one is bound to care for oneself, to discipline oneself in the beginning. This does not, however, guarantee towards a passage to the posthuman yet (Kahambing, 2018) but on a careful use of power within the ambit of the ambiguous modern power play. To end, “though Foucault shows how the discourse of sexual liberation is really a discourse of sexual discipline” (Dean, 1994, p. 294).

4. CONCLUSION

The production of docile bodies, which are products of discourses and power-relations and are all part of the disciplinary mechanisms of pedagogy and sex, is an important realization in the analysis of contemporary society. The idea is that pedagogy and sex must be appraised and must be wielded correctly because, whether we intentionally act on them or not, we are indeed acting on them. There is a sense in which pedagogy remains a ubiquitous site for power and the danger lies in the agent utilizing it in the ambivalent paths of sovereign or disciplinary power. The choices and acts we make assume a pedagogical role and they become locus of knowledge in the epistemological mapping of human imitation, cognition, and practice. Sex, too, and more particularly the discourse on sex, assumes a rather powerful function in the making of contemporary society. Resistances representing the freedom for sexual liberation are modes of power that can shape lives and circumvent structures and traditional set-ups of patriarchal establishments. What we can make sense in all these is that a higher cause must be initiated for the economics of power,
especially in the areas of pedagogy and sex, though there are other areas that need focusing as well. As Foucault says: “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. I think that the ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger” (Dreyfus and Rabino1983).

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