FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS: WHAT IS NEXT?

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Abstract
The League of Nations emerged as a formation revealed by victorious states for were seeking peace during the First World War. The agreements concluded at the end of the First World War have severe conditions on the defeated states. This has led to the formation of revisionist and anti-revisionist fronts. The revisionist states want to change the order and agreement conditions after the war and the anti-revisionist states want the continuation of the established order. In such an environment, the League of Nations’ well-intentioned attempts to protect peace could not prevent the outbreak of the Second World War.

The United Nations, which was established at the end of the Second World War, was criticized in particular about the structure of the Security Council and the right to veto and it was constantly expressed that there was a need for a serious reform in its structure. Changes in the structure of the Security Council, such as increasing the number of permanent members, have so far been inconclusive.

In this study, League of Nations and the United Nations’ process and the successes and failures of both international organizations were examined. As a result of the analysis, it was seen that the main reason for the failure was not directly the institutions themselves. The member states of these institutions are constantly trying to use the functions of these institutions to realize their own country interests. This has weakened these organizations to achieve their goals. As a result of the study, recommendations were made regarding the United Nations Security Council and peacekeeping missions.

Keywords: League of Nations, United Nations, Peacekeeping, Security Council, Veto Power.

Introduction

Born out of the devastating consequences of the First World War, the League of Nations failed to achieve peaceful sovereignty in the world and did not prevent the emergence of the Second World War. The League of Nations remained ineffective in intervention and resolution of regional conflicts that took place in the process up to the Second World War. The main responsibility of the process leading to the beginning of the Second World War is the agreements, in particular Versailles, which contain very severe conditions in terms of defeated countries of the First World War.

After the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN) was established for similar purposes. Established as a product of the effort to prevent the re-occurrence of destructive wars in the world, the organization has determined the main objective of providing international peace and security. The objectives of promoting inter-state cooperation, solving economic and social problems together, and passing humanitarian principles to life are among the aims of the UN Charter Agreement.

Europe has embarked on the worst death course of its bloody past between 1914-1918. Almost twenty million people have lost their lives. Ottoman, Austria-Hungarian and Russian Empires were disappeared in the history. New countries such as Czechoslovakia, Estonia and Finland were born. In short, a new world order emerged.

President Woodrow Wilson declared to a joint session of the U.S. Congress in 1919:

“It is a definite guaranty of peace. It is a definite guaranty by word against aggression. It is a definite guaranty against the things which have just come near bringing the whole structure of civilization into ruin. Its purposes do not for a moment lie vague. Its purposes are declared, and its powers are unmistakable. It is not in contemplation that this should be merely a league to secure the peace of the world. It is a league which can be used for cooperation in any international matter.”

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The president was not alone in putting such high hopes into the new organization. With open idealism and new internationalism, Wilson offered a hope for a better future. But in retrospect, Wilson's own rhetoric does not seem to be in place. The League of Nations received a devastating blow when the US Senate refused to approve the Versailles Treaty. The country has never joined the League and has ensured that the newly established organization is permanently hindered.

The League, a winning organization, was dominated by Great Britain and France, with Italy and Japan, along with two other permanent members of the League Council (the rugged equivalent of the UN Security Council and the highest authority in international security matters). The majority of the twenty-eight founding members represented in the General Assembly came from Latin America and Europe.

Germany and the Soviet Union were members, but only briefly: “Germany joined in 1926, only to exit the League after the Nazis came to power in 1933. In 1933 the Soviet Union entered the League. Six years later, after its attack on Finland in late 1939, the USSR became the only League member ever to be expelled. By that point the League had also seen the departure of two of its founding members. Unhappy with the League’s criticism of its occupation of Manchuria, Japan left the club in 1933. In 1935–36 Italy was equally dismissive of its membership obligations after its successful attack and occupation of Ethiopia, one of the three African members of the League (the others were Liberia and South Africa).”

The League of Nations was hampered by the inability to put pressure on the aggression cases. According to the treaty, the Union may bring verbal or economic sanctions against an aggressor and, if these methods fail, intervene in military intervention. In theory, these steps were logical and reasonable. But economic sanctions required international co-operation, although verbal sanctions could not deter a determined and powerful aggressor. A country that suffers from the pressures of economic sanctions may still trade with non-members, as the league has no authority beyond its limited membership. Especially in the international economic crisis of the 1930s, it was not difficult to find willing trading partners.

The United Nations’ first “Declaration” dates back to 1 January 1942, and representatives from twenty-six nations promised their governments to continue to fight together to defeat Axis powers and achieve a “just” peace (Hanimaki, 2008, 8-13).

Born out of the horrors and ashes of World War II, the creation of the United Nations in 1945 aroused the universal hope that the new system of collective security enshrined in the world organization would prevent the recurrence of the catastrophic events of the first half of the 20th century and build a pathway toward greater justice and prosperity.

Looking back over the past tribulations of the UN, one can indeed find sobering instances of inconsistencies, benign neglect, and outright cases of failures to act: the paralysis of the Security Council stymied by an abusive use of the “veto” throughout the Cold War; the intractable issues of Palestine, Kashmir, Cyprus, and western Sahara; the ignominious hands-off posture in the 1975–1978 and 1994 genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda; the abrupt withdrawal from Somalia in 1993; the massacre of thousands in Srebrenica, after the council had declared the town a “safe area” in 1995 (Fomerand, 2009, v).

The Security Council was not established as a “law enforcement agency”, but as a deliberate “political body”; and it is not surprising that the Council has so far never flagged an aggressor or a shared offense for the use of force by a state. It is largely established as a police officer, not a jury, and operates mainly in a political mode (Krisch, 2008, 143).

1. League of Nations

The League of Nations was an absolute novelty in the history of international relations. An organization on such a scale, covering all fields of international cooperation, never existed before. Still, the idea behind it was not new. Voluntary cooperation between states or city-states had already occurred in ancient times. Alliances then were usually meant as a defensive weapon against enemy states (Ginneken, 2006, 1).

World War (WW) I leaders made a historic decision. They decided that the great challenges of peace and war could no longer be left to individual countries to fix on their own. They needed a permanent organization to make lasting peace possible. As a result, the League of Nations, the UN’s direct forerunner, was born (Bookmiller, 2008, 17).

1. The Emergence of the Idea of the Founding of the League of Nations

Already during WW I plans were devised in the United States of America (US) and in Great Britain that provided for a permanent world-wide organization to be established after the war with the main purpose to secure once and for all international peace and security through efficient and legally binding safeguards. US President Wilson first commissioned the project of a Nations League as a basis for a new
political order after the central world peace organization and war. On 8 January 1918 President Wilson made a statement before the US Senate in which he submitted 14 proposals (Wilson’s 14 points) including the project of the establishment of such international organization. At the Paris Peace Conference under US leadership the victorious powers were quick to agree to the Statute of the League of Nations forming an integral part of the various Paris peace treaties. The new world organization was established and Geneva became its headquarters. The organization started its activities in 1920. Its goals and principles as well as its structure, in spite of all differences, resemble that of the UN as its successor organization to a high degree. The basic concept of the League of Nations, that is to provide peace between nations through a collective security system, is the same as the future UN project (Cede, 2001a, 4).

U.S. President Woodrow Wilson is often popularly credited with being the “father” of the league and, in fact, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. Though Wilson’s contributions were many and significant, statesmen from around the world were consumed by the same concern: “How can world peace be achieved? How can all members of the global community feel safe, irrespective of how large or small they are, or their power status?” For these politicians and diplomats, the answer could only be one thing: “the unprecedented creation of a permanent world body that all countries would belong to, in which they would collectively band together to make all members feel secure.” The thinking was that one country’s aggression against another would be countered with overwhelming diplomatic, economic, and military resistance by the rest of the organization’s members, in what is known as collective security.

In one of the most famous and astonishing treaty rejections in all of American history, the US Senate voted down the Treaty of Versailles in November 1919 and again in March 1920. The Senate’s rebuffs reflected the long-standing American fear of losing sovereignty, or control, over U.S. affairs, to a higher legal and political entity. As a result, the United States never joined Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations (Bookmiller, 2008, 20-22).

What is new is that the idea of unity has, as it were, joined hands with the material necessity for unity pressing up from below, that the pre-war sporadic attempts to organize the world internationally have been combined, modernized and expanded into a vast permanent system; that fifty-odd states have pledged themselves to work this system; and that thereby the idea of the unity of mankind has been deliberately expressed in terms of practical politics, lias been brought to earth by binding treaty obligations and clothed in the flesh and blood of institutions. The League is still a tentative and imperfect thing, but it exists, is several years old, and is alive and growing (Ellis, 1928, 61-62).

1.2. Purpose of League of Nations

The League’s primary purpose, outlined in its preamble, was to “promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security”. Articles 10–17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations formed the core of its collective security system, the thrust of member states’ obligations finding expression in Article 10, which provided that:

“The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.” (Wilson, 2014: 20)

1.3. Weakness of League of Nations

Obviously the League of Nations was unable to fulfill the “core of its mandate”, i.e. to prevent future wars. Its failure was definite when it could not forestall the outbreak of WW II. During the war the League of Nations was of no political relevance whatsoever.

The following reasons may be mentioned to explain the failure of the League of Nations to fulfill its essential mission of international peacekeeping and the prevention of armed conflicts: “Its structural weakness (e.g. the unanimity rule for decision making both in the Council and the Assembly), the deficient regulation of the prohibition to use military force and the lack of universal membership. The US never became a member of the League of Nations. Furthermore important players on the international plane (such as Germany, Italy or Japan) left the organization after a short time or (such as the Soviet Union) were excluded. The Third World was conspicuously absent since wide areas of Africa or Asia still stood under colonial rule and therefore did not fulfill the requirement of sovereignty prescribed for membership.”

The balance sheet of the League of Nations is not entirely negative as it soon developed into a useful platform for international cooperation in the social and economic field, which intensified significantly. All things considered, however, the League of Nations was not a success story. The responsibility for its collapse did not rest solely on the deficiencies described but was mainly caused by the “power interests of some
political key players of the time who disregarded the principles and objectives of the League’s Statute and who resorted to the use of military force without restriction whenever they found it appropriate to settle their scores” (Cede, 2001a, 5-6; see also Wells, 2005, 8).

An outstanding example of this ambivalence was, of course, the Italo-Abyssinian War, which forced League members to condemn Italy as an enemy of the collective system, whereas the same country remained the “friend” of the status quo security system. The ambivalence also offers an explanation for the fact that delegates of member states advocated disarmament and free trade in Geneva, and armament and tariff barriers back home. Obviously, the key word here was the notion of sovereignty. No member state had been willing, or would ever be willing, to renounce its sovereign rights. Sovereignty remained the basis for the network of international relationships. And because each state considered itself the best guardian of its own interests, there could be no such thing as a homogeneous international organization (Ginneken, 2006, 6-7).

1.4. The League of Nations in Reality

The 1920s were a golden period for the league. With the pain and sorrow of WW I still fresh on people’s minds and the benefits of general economic prosperity, many were hopeful about the new organization’s prospects. Almost from the outset, the league became a global leader in the economic, social, and humanitarian fields. By 1939, more than 60 percent of the league’s budget was dedicated to humanitarian causes. The growth of international law between countries was also strengthened, as the league fostered the development of 120 new treaties and the world court heard 66 cases between states.

Yet these significant accomplishments cannot disguise the fact that the league was unable to halt the slide to an even more catastrophic and devastating conflict, WW II. By the 1930s, the world body witnessed its weakening position as the hub of international affairs. During this decade, a worldwide economic depression, starting with the 1929 stock-market crash in the United States, forced member states to look inward and focus on their own national interests, rather than seek cooperation with other countries (Bookmiller, 2008, 26).

1.5. Successes and Failures of Leagues of Nations

The record of the League was even worse, even in matters of peace and war. In its first years, the League has begun to fulfill its promises once or twice, when the event is small and the nation is weak: “It resolved a frontier dispute between Finland and Sweden; defended the sovereignty of infant Albania when she was threatened by Greek and Yugoslav forces; secured the withdrawal of Greek forces from Bulgaria in 1925 and the payment of compensation by Greece after an incident between the two countries; resolved a territorial dispute between Turkey and Iraq over Mosul; and even, in 1934, sent a small peace-keeping force to occupy an area disputed between Colombia and Peru, which secured the withdrawal of Peruvian forces. All of these, though relatively trivial, could be regarded by optimists as the successful application of the principles the League was created to uphold” (Luard, 1982, 3-4).

Despite this success, the League council could not act decisively against the aggressiveness of Italy and Japan in the 1930s. Collective security failed while England and France maintained their national interests. The voluntary sanctions sanctioned by Italy after the occupation of Ethiopia in 1935 had little impact. The absence of great power support for the league was especially evident in joining the network, with the failure of the United States as a result of the re-emergence of the opposition of the Congress and its isolation (Mingst and Karns, 2012, 21).

The failure of the League of Nations made it possible to recognize the lack of liberal democratic countries. The problems of the League have come to fruition because of the behavior of non-democratic members. As soon as Germany passed the fascist rule, it left the League. This development has been the beginning of the end for the League. The failure to prevent the outbreak of World War II in 1939 has not destroyed the belief in the need for a universal organization. On the contrary, it has made a commitment to draw lessons from past mistakes and to build a better equipped body to preserve international peace in the future (Aleksovski and Bakreski, 2014, 276).

The failures of the League of Nations made it clear that the key to a lasting peace was the unity of purpose among the great powers. Thus, the focus of the cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union has been largely focused (Oudenaren, 2009, 3).

Eloranta gives some explanations related to failures (quoted from Maurice Vaïsse, 1993); “It failed because it was an imperfect instrument for achieving disarmament; It failed because the League was not universal; It failed because of the confrontation between Great Britain and France; It failed because there were domestic forces inside the countries hostile to disarmament; It failed because the Disarmament Conference was convened too late, under hostile conditions; It failed because of the confrontation between
France and Germany at the Disarmament Conference; It failed because of the overly ambitious aims and the practical problems involved in the reduction of armaments.” And the league has failed. Because the League was seen as an advocate and has a stance for status quo of the order which resulted from Versailles Treaty (Eloranta, 2005, 1).

2. The United Nations

In this section, the general structure of the organization as an international organization will be tried to be revealed by explaining the founding stages, aims and principles of the United Nations, membership, and representation in the general assembly, main bodies and budget.

2.1. Establishment of the United Nations

National decisions reflect a realistic (or at least realistic) calculation of the nature of multilateral cooperation in order to work together and build subsequent peace into an essential part of the first mobilization against fascism (Plesch and Weiss, 2015, 200).

1945 was the pinnacle of the “four-year concentrated preparation”. During these years, the idea of a world organization to replace the “League of Nations” was debated for the first time and then emerged. Many of the “key principles of the UN adopted” in San Francisco came from previous conferences (Gall and Hobby, 2007, 9).

When the UN was founded, there was a general desire to learn the lessons of the failures of the League of Nations. The league failed, it was felt for four main reasons. First, “it had had no teeth: no armed force of its own it could call on to withstand aggression”. Secondly, “it had lacked authority, above all the authority to impose collective decisions to defend a member that was attacked”. Thirdly, “it had been paralyzed in crisis situations by the rule of unanimity, inherited from nineteenth-century conferences, by which all members had to agree (except the parties to a dispute) for any decision to be reached”. Fourth, “the absence of several major powers – the US throughout its life, the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Japan for much of it, had made it unrepresentative and impotent” (Luard, 1979, 9).

President Roosevelt had prepared a paper before he died. That never-delivered address contains the often-quoted words: “The work, my friends, is peace; more than an end of this war-an end to the beginning of all wars;…as we go forward toward the greatest contribution that any generation of human beings can make in this world-the contribution of lasting peace-I ask you to keep up your faith…” (Gall and Hobby, 2007, 10).

The legitimacy issues of new organizations are very challenging. There is a great need for a new organization to be seen as legitimate by achieving a good reputation, but there is no institutional power to establish itself. First, the very design of the conference is a strong indication that the Great Powers believed that legitimation was crucial to establishing the new organization. The sponsors conceived of the San Francisco conference partly as a way to generate the belief among the rank-and-file states that the new organization, and the Council within it, was legitimate and therefore deserved their respect. Great Powers arrived at San Francisco committed to avoiding any significant changes to the draft Charter. They successfully resisted every pressure to weaken their broad powers of veto over all collective actions on international security.

Second, the hypothesis that “fairness” generates legitimacy finds little support in the evidence from San Francisco. Neither the ground rules of the conference nor the contents of the draft Charter were seen as particularly “fair” in the sense of treating all participants equally, but this did not produce much controversy. The sponsors had special privileges in the procedures of the conference, and the Great Powers were guaranteed special powers in the Council itself. The complaint of “unfairness” of procedure or of substance was rarely made in the course of the conference. Complaints about inequality were raised from time to time but not in the language of fairness.

Finally, the role played by the conference procedures is important at San Francisco. The small states used the openings available to them under the rules of procedure of the conference to express their opposition to the veto, but once these openings were exhausted the small states shifted from opposition to support. The opponents of the veto allowed their opposition to be contained within the procedural bounds set by existing understandings about how international conferences should be organized. They did not continue to pursue their preferences through other channels (Hurd, 2007, 174-175).

2.2. Purposes and Principles

The UN is open to all States, so that it came to be the world’s first international organization that might properly be called universal (Grant, 2009: 2)
The main aims of the UN are set forth in the Preamble to the Charter, in which “the peoples of the United Nations,” assembled in San Francisco in June 1945, expressed their determination;

- “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind,...”
- “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,...”
- “to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained,” and
- “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom...”

To accomplish these goals, they agreed;

- “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors,...”
- “to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security,...”
- “to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest,” and
- “to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples...”

In pursuit of these purposes, the Charter stipulates that the UN and its members are to act in accordance with the following principles:

- “that the organization is based on the sovereign equality of all its members”;
- “that all members are to fulfill in good faith their Charter obligations”;
- “that they are to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and without endangering peace, security, and justice”;
- “that they are to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against other states”;
- “that they are to give in their every assistance in any action that it takes in accordance with the Charter and shall not assist states against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action”; and
- “that the UN shall also ensure that states that are not members act in accordance with these principles insofar as is necessary to maintain international peace and security”; and
- “that nothing in the Charter is to authorize the UN to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, though this principle is not to prejudice the application of enforcement measures made necessary in the event of a threat to or breach of the peace” (Gall and Hobby, 2007, 12; see also UNDP, 2004, 5 and Bailey, 1989, 2).

The precise determination of the principle of non-intervention is further complicated by the wide spectrum of possible political, economic or other pressures. It requires quite a balanced judgement to distinguish in a concrete case between the exercise of permissible influence and forbidden interference in domestic affairs. Bearing in mind their respective interests the States concerned are rarely in a position to make a fair distinction by them. For these reasons the definition of the exact scope of the principle of non-intervention remains a difficult undertaking always bearing the risk of controversy (Cede, 2001b, 24).

### 2.3. Membership

Membership of the United Nations is open to all peace-loving states which accept and can carry out the obligations of its Charter (Nicol, 1981, 3).

The procedure of admission is as follows. “A state wishing to join submits an application to the Secretary-General, in which it formally states its acceptance of the Charter obligations. The application is forwarded to the Security Council. If the Security Council, by a vote of at least nine members (formerly seven), including all the permanent members, recommends the application, membership becomes effective on the day that it is approved by a two thirds majority of the General Assembly.” In other words, “if any one of the Security Council’s permanent members vetoes it, or if it fails to obtain a sufficient majority in the Security Council, the application does not reach the General Assembly at all”.

While the Charter of the League of Nations contains provisions for the legal withdrawal of members, the UN Charter is deliberately ignoring all references to the issue. At the San Francisco Conference, the majority felt that the withdrawal provisions were contrary to the principle of universality and could create a gap for members who wanted to avoid their obligations under the Terms (Gall and Hobby, 2007, 13-14).

### 2.4. The Charter of the UN as the Constitution of the International Community of States
The great authority the UN Charter enjoys today and its universal validity are further strong arguments in favor of the world organization. As nearly all States have become members of the UN, the UN Charter occupies a position that gives it an enhanced status among all other international treaties, insofar as the priority of the obligations deriving from the Charter enshrined in Art. 103 sets it apart from other instruments of international law. Within its objectives and principles the Charter contains a number of rules which are of central importance to the peaceful cooperation among States. It provides instruments for the peaceful settlement of disputes and a system of collective security in cases of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace.

Since at present nearly all States are obliged to honor the provisions of the Charter as members of the UN and in view of the high degree of international cooperation in the UN framework some authors describe the Charter as the constitution of the international community. This approach to the Charter derives from national legal concepts. It views the UN as the custodian of the values and interests common to the international community as a whole (community interests). In such a perspective the community of States assembled under the umbrella of the UN is quite different from the sum of all Member States. It is, however, doubtful whether the vision of a harmonious community of nations peacefully gathered under the roof of the UN Charter corresponds to the harsh realities of the present world (Cede, 2001a, 8-9).

2.5. Main Organs of the United Nations

Under the United Nations Charter six principal organs of the UN Organization have been established. Since the organization came into existence, its principal organs, and in some cases also its Member States on the basis of specific international treaties, established secondary organizational structures such as Committees, Commissions, Standing Conferences, Funds, Programs, High Commissioners, different secretarial structures, Offices and Representatives, all commonly referred to as subsidiary bodies of the United Nations. These secondary structures are usually the result of a process of “natural” growth of the organization, whereby some subsidiary bodies developed different degrees of autonomy from the organizational structures originally provided for by the Charter (Trauttmansdorff, 2001, 25).

2.5.1. The General Assembly (GA)

Although the recommendations made by the GA do as such not have legally binding force, resolutions of the GA which restate and thus confirm certain legal opinions over a longer period of time without persistent objection have, in the light of existing State practice, indeed legally binding effects under
international law despite the lack of formal powers of the GA under the Charter to adopt acts creating legal obligations for members (Peterson, 2006, 1).

Under the Charter, the functions and powers of the General Assembly include:

- “to consider and make recommendations on the principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms regulation”;
- “to discuss any question relating to international peace and security and, except where a dispute or situation is being discussed by the Security Council, to make recommendations on it”;
- “to discuss and, with the same exception, make recommendations on any question within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and functions of any organ of the United Nations”;
- “to initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international political cooperation, the development and codification of international law, the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and international collaboration in the economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields”;
- “to make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation, regardless of origin, which might impair friendly relations among nations”; 
- “to receive and consider reports from the Security Council and other United Nations organs”;
- “to consider and approve the United Nations budget and to apportion the contributions among members”;
- “to elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the members of the Economic and Social Council and additional members of the Trusteeship Council (when necessary); to elect jointly with the Security Council the Judges of the International Court of Justice; and, on the recommendation of the Security Council, to appoint the Secretary-General.” (UNDPI, 2004, 6-7).

The Security Council implements a variety of sanctions in a wide range from comprehensive safeguards to prevent the flow of all products and goods to specific items such as arms, timber or diamonds, or simple precautions targeting specific activities such as diplomatic relations or travel (Farrall, 2007, 4).

2.5.2. The Security Council (SC)

The Security Council has primary responsibility under the Charter for the “maintenance of international peace and security”. Under Article 25 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations “agree to accept and execute the decisions of the Security Council”. While the other bodies of the United Nations are present in the recommendations to the member states, the Council alone has the authority to take decisions that the member states are obliged to implement (UNDPI, 2004, 8-9).

The debate on the reform of the SC, which was repeatedly taken up since then, focused on the enlargement of the number of permanent seats in the SC (including for instance Germany and Japan and corresponding countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean) and on an increase of the number of nonpermanent members. All concrete proposals brought forward in this regard have so far not been successful (Trauttmansdorff, 2001, 35; see also Luck, 2005, 143-152; 111-122).

The Charter identifies four functions over which the SC has primary authority:

- “The SC identifies the existence of a threat”.
- “The SC advocates peaceful resolutions to the threat”.
- “The SC may advocate embargoes, economic sanctions and other nonmilitary strategies”.
- “The SC may, in the last analysis, recommend or not recommend military action”. (Wells, 2005, 73).

Chairmanship rotates among the Council’s member states according to their “English alphabetical order”, a new president (as the chairman is called) presiding every month. It is up to the president to decide whether to preside during the discussion of a question that directly concerns his own country.

Council members normally are represented by the heads of their permanent missions to the UN, who have the rank of ambassador. Any state that “is not currently a council member but is a party to a dispute under consideration by the council must be invited to send representatives to participate in the proceedings”, though without the right to vote. When the council is discussing a matter other than an actual dispute, the decision to invite the participation of any UN member states whose interests are directly affected is left to its discretion. The council has usually acceded to requests for such invitations. It has also granted representatives of national liberation organizations the opportunity to speak at a number of meetings.
Every member of the Security Council has one vote. Upon a procedural question, a motion takes place if any nine members receive a positive vote. In essence, the decision requires the positive votes of nine members, including the common member of the permanent members. However, any member should refrain from voting in any decision concerning a peaceful solution to a dispute, whether permanent or contrary.

The veto power and its implementation by permanent members continues to be a central feature of the Security Council mechanism since the end of the Cold War, although the use of a new collegial climate is rare. Although “Veto” is not included in the charter, it is a common use condition for a decision to defeat by using “nay” of one of five “permanent” members. The negative votes given by permanent members in the council use veto power only against essential questions, not just procedural matters. Moreover, in the longstanding ongoing practice, the provision of a statute requiring all solid decisions to take the common votes of permanent members means that a decision can still be maintained, provided that the permanent member does not vote actively.

Since the founding of the UN, the great powers that existed since the Second World War protected their privileged positions on the one hand by securing their permanent membership in Charter and on the other by protecting them by veto-power. Abstention or absence of a permanent member does not hinder a decision (Gall and Hobby, 2007, 33).

2.5.3. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

ECOSOC is assigned the task of organizing the UN’s work on economic and social matters and the promotion of human rights. The ECOSOC is composed of 54 members, which are geographically distributed as follows: “14 Africa, 11 Asia, 10 Latin America and the Caribbean, 13 Western Group (WEOG) and 6 Eastern European states”. The duration of membership is three years. Although neither established in the Charter nor otherwise legally determined, the permanent members of the SC are de facto permanently represented in ECOSOC. The non-members of ECOSOC may participate in the work of ECOSOC as observers without the right to vote. Upon request they may also participate in the debate (Trauttmansdorff, 2001, 38).

Under Article 55 of the charter, the organization is committed to promote the following goals:

- higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
- solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
- universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Gall and Hobby, 2007, 41).

2.5.4. The Trusteeship Council (TC)

As for the colonial issue, two regions of territory were defined for different treatment. The new drafts were distinguished territories under the UN supervision or the rest of the world of colonialism. All the columns except those given as trusteeship should be known as self-governing regions. For them, the ruling states had the task of advancing the people but not giving them independence; self-management has been maintained as a goal. It is obliged to inform the General Assembly of the administration of the States. The system of the board of trustees was less controversial because it was familiar from the system of authority of the League of Nations, and it only reached out to volunteer old missions or innovations (Baehr and Gordenker, 2005, 18).

After 1945 the movement towards normative statehood would accelerate. In 1920 there were some fifty independent states; today there are more than two hundred. Colonies and protectorates, condominiums and trust territories, those trailing appendages of empire, have vanished from the globe. Yet if statehood is now ubiquitous, its makeup is varied indeed. Some states set their own rules, but others lack not only that ‘monopoly over the legitimate use of force’ which the great German sociologist Max Weber considered the foundation of statehood but also the capacity to provide their citizens with basic services and rights. Their leaders retort that they are as subjected by global corporations and international lending bodies as they once were by imperial states (Pedersen, 2015, 13).

On 1 October 1994 the last remaining Trusteeship territory, the island republic of Palau, was granted independence. This act terminated the last existing trusteeship agreement. The trusteeship system of the UN, which represents a continuation of the system of mandates under the League of Nations, has thus come to an end. This also constituted the implementation of the last actual function of the TC under the Charter. According to its rules of procedure, which have been revised for the last time in 1994, the TC shall also meet in the future if circumstances so require. Its significance as principal organ of the UN has, however, been
lost. Recently, some initiatives within the framework of the GA have envisaged a transformation of the TC and an assignment of new functions to it. These efforts, so far, have not led to any concrete results (Trauttmansdorff, 2001, 43).

2.5.5. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)

ICJ is the main judicial body of the UN. It consists of 15 judges elected for nine years by independent vote by GA and SC. Any nationality may not have more than one judge. Court members do not represent their own government, they are independent judges.

By joining the UN, each country binds itself, in the words of the Charter, “to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to which it is a party.” If any party to a case violates this obligation, the other party “may have recourse to the SC, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.” (Gall and Hobby, 2007, 3, 50).

2.5.6. The Secretariat

The Secretariat is hierarchically structured, i.e. all positions of members of the staff derive their powers from the UN-Secretary General (SG) and have to report to him. According to Art. 101 (1), the UN-SG appoints members of the staff in accordance with guidelines established by the GA. In 1997, for the first time, a Deputy Secretary-General has been appointed in order to assist the UN-SG in the discharge of his functions and in order to assume a key role for coordination within the entire UN system (Trauttmansdorff, 2001, 44).

The single restriction on the Secretariat is that “in the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization,” and that “they shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.” As a corollary to this injunction, the charter puts member nations under the obligation to “respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.” (Gall and Hobby, 2007, 54).

2.6. The United Nations Budget

The basic rule in “assessing” how much each member country should contribute to the UN is simple: the wealthier the country is, the more it must pay. Some member nations are in arrears on their payments, most notably the United States. The European Union countries contribute roughly 35% of the total operating budget. Special UN programs — such as UNICEF and UNDP — are not included in the regular budget and are financed by voluntary contributions from member governments (Hanhimak, 2008, 46-47).

![Figure 2. Country Contributions to UN, 2018-2019 (GA Res.: 72/263).](image-url)

The United Nations is an enormous international organization consisting of six main bodies and dozens of sub-agencies affiliated with these main bodies. The issue of reforming the UN structure is a topic that is being discussed both in the organization and in academic circles outside the organization. The point is that there is a consensus on both sides that reform is necessary. It is not possible to achieve the results in a single study by taking into account the entire main and sub-organs of the UN organization together with reform. For this reason, as stated in the purpose of the study, this section will be dealt with in terms of peacekeeping and Security Council.

3.1. Peacekeeping Concept in the UN Charter

The concept of “peacekeeping” is not a concept entered into the Constitution of the Union when the UN was founded in 1945. Peacekeeping concepts and practices were born and developed as a mechanism created by this universal organization to fill the gap that emerged in the following years as a result of the inability of the collective security system foreseen in the UN Constitution to function properly. Peacekeeping activities constitute the vast majority of UN efforts to resolve disputes that threaten international peace and security (White, 1990, 166).

3.2. Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

The SC is primarily the body of the UN responsible for ensuring peace and security, members accepts and implements the decisions of the Council in accordance with Article 25. Peacekeeping operations have been installed to help control conflicts that threaten international peace among members; such operations are impartial and can only be established at the expense of the belligerent governments. The aim of the peacekeeping operation is to facilitate the peaceful dissolution of the dispute with diplomatic and mediating channels, after creating a truce and then creating a buffer zone between the belligerents.

Prior to the end of the Cold War peacekeeping operations were designed to monitor ceasefires, control buffer zones and prevent the resumption of hostilities. “Peace-keeping forces are made up of contingents of troops provided by Member States and financed by the international community. The soldiers of the United Nations peace-keeping forces have light weapons, but can use them only in self-defence.” A crucial aspect of UN peacekeeping has always been its perceived impartiality: “An operation must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host country, and must not be used in any way to favour one party against another in internal conflicts.” This understanding of peace has been radically sad since 1990. The events in the Gulf War, Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda have had tremendous demands on the UN to monitor a wide range of explosive and dangerous conflicts. It is envisaged when the UN Charter is prepared (Arnold, 1997: 10; see also Sens, 2004, 142).

The factors to be considered in the establishment of new peacekeeping operations included:

• “whether a situation exists that presents a threat to international peace and security”;
• “whether regional or sub-regional organizations already exist and can assist in resolving the situation”;
• “whether a cease-fire exists and whether the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement”;
• “whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the mandate”;
• “whether a precise mandate for a United Nations operation can be formulated”; and
• “whether the safety and security of UN personnel can be reasonably insured; in particular, whether the parties to a dispute offer reasonable guarantees of safety to UN personnel” (Gall and Hobby, 2007, 38).

3.3. The Difficulties for Peacekeeping Operations

Peace-keeping operations have also changed remarkably in their content and mandates. While before they were concerned with the implementation of ceasefire agreements or similar measures to reduce military activity and thus to increase the chances of a negotiating process, peace-keeping operations today usually are characterized by a multidimensional approach: “in addition to the traditional objectives they assist in the reestablishment of administrative or other governmental structures, they deal with humanitarian assistance and assistance for refugees and internally displaced persons, they extend to measures of economic and social reconstruction and improvements in the system of human rights protection.” This “holistic” approach also corresponds with the tendency to employ peace-keeping operations predominantly in the context of internal conflicts, usually caused by ethnic disturbances, whereas
the “traditional” international conflicts have lost most of their relevance. Peace-keeping operations with such comprehensive mandates often include elements of a “post-conflict peace-building strategy”.

This multidimensionality of modern peace-keeping operations and their mandates as well as their predominant deployment in intra-state conflicts are however also the origin of many current problems with regard to the conduct of such operations. These complexities, taken together with often diverse political interests of SC Members can easily lead to overlapping or even contradictory mandates resulting from different decisions adopted by the Council over a period of time. Too often there is a wide gap between a broad mandate defined with political considerations in mind and a distinct lack of will to provide the UN with the necessary support in terms of material, finances and personnel for the implementation of the mandate.

The most obvious case was the UN’s engagement in the former Yugoslavia. There the UN’s involvement only occurred after the blatant failure of regional European efforts undertaken by the OSCE and the European Union. The mandates given by the SC to the UN-SG for the build-up of the UN activities mirrored the political discord among the Council’s members. Even more devastating was the impossibility to engage troops in sufficient strength although the UN Secretariat had presented very clear assessments to the Council. It would certainly be wrong to draw lasting conclusions from the UN’s “failure” in the former Yugoslavia as to the value of peace-keeping operations in general or the UN’s capability to mount and execute such operations. However, this and similar examples clearly have proven the limitations and difficulties the Organization faces in implementing complex peace-keeping tasks: “questionable mandates, characterized by politically inspired compromises, unclear lines of command and uncertainties in the interplay of political and military leadership as well as the lack of clear rules to deal with emerging contradictions between humanitarian tasks and mandates that also include the right to use force.”

These negative experiences with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), compounded with similar negative conclusion, first of all drawn by the American public from the Somalia operation have led to the remarkable restraint in the number of new peace-keeping operations, established at the end of the 1990s. It remains to be seen whether the new trend to new PKOs - which paradoxically started after the bypassing of the UN during NATO’s Kosovo operation with SC Res. 1244 of 10 June 1999 entrusting the UN with the establishment of an international civil presence in Kosovo to provide an interim administration - will be more than another episode in the UN’s history. For that to happen Member States would have to muster political will around the UN and endow the organization with the necessary financial and military means. (Sucharipa, 2001, 319-320; see also Templeton, 1998, 30; Bercovitch, 1998, 49).

3.4. Disputes on Veto Right and Permanent Membership for the Security Council

The Charter of the UN is based on the international principle of sovereign equality of all States, but also reflects the inequalities in the international scene after the end of World War II. The authors of the Charter established the SC with limited membership and secured for themselves a preferential position on it: they are permanent members and have the right of veto. In the course of the decades this elitist power structure has given rise to criticism and ambitions to reform the Council.

Changes in the original composition of the GA as a result of the de-colonization process and the admission of new members triggered the first enlargement debate in the 1950s. In 1963 the GA decided to increase the membership of the SC from eleven to fifteen members by adding four non-permanent seats. In addition, GA Res. 1991 (XVIII) determined the distribution of non-permanent seats among the different regional groups and redefined the quorum for decision-making of the Council.

Also the second enlargement debate was motivated by the intention to restore the initial numerical ratio between GA and SC in favor of the developing countries, which - by far - constitute the majority of the GA. This endeavor, which had been initiated by India in 1979, finally failed not least due to the opposition of the permanent members (P5).

In the early 1990s, new dynamics in the international political scene as a consequence of the end of the East-West confrontation caused growing interest in the work of the SC. At the same time, members of the UN increasingly questioned the legitimacy of Council decisions, which were taken by the fifteen on behalf of the all members of the Organization. In 1992, the 113 Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) called for a thorough review of the composition of the SC as well as the scope and the application of the right of veto.

In autumn 1992 the GA item “The Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the membership of the Security Council” was reactivated and thus the current enlargement discussion launched. During the debate, which was dominated by Brazil, Egypt, Germany, India and Japan, as well as in written
comments, a number of countries spoke in favor of an early reform, which should ensure better representation of the entire UN membership on the Council as well as more efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy, credibility and transparency of its work.

The majority of States strictly opposed any extension of the “undemocratic” right of veto, which should in any case be eliminated, to new permanent members. The pretenders for permanent membership, however, claimed the same rights as the current permanent members. The P5 made it very clear that their prerogatives were sacrosanct.

Contrary to its previous negative attitude towards SC reform, the US expressed itself in favor of an enlargement “by adding Germany and Japan as new permanent members” and representatives from the African, Asian and Latin American regional group as permanent members in an enlarged SC with not more than 21 seats.

According to France, participation in peace-keeping operations and the willingness to assume global responsibility should be decisive for the selection of new permanent members. Enlargement in the permanent category should not imply any reduction in the number of non-permanent seats of a specific region. Over the years France was among those who favored an increase in both categories with permanent membership for Germany and Japan and an overall number of 21 to 25 seats.

The Russian Federation (RF) and China were in no hurry to reform the SC. They were of the opinion that any ideas, on how to improve the transparency of the Council’s working methods, should be discussed primarily within the Council itself.

Over the years of reform discussions Germany and Japan reiterated with persistence their preparedness to assume the duties of permanent membership. Both countries are among the largest contributors to the budget of the UN and are very active in the field of development aid and development cooperation.

At the 30th summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Tunis in 1994, the 54 members formulated their claim to two permanent seats, which should be filled according to an African rotation mechanism. Egypt is the third country to claim leadership. While Egypt is committed to complying with all OAU positions, it argues that the African rotation criteria should include such criteria as the degree of present and future economic development, history and the geographic location and size of a country’s population.

When reform protagonists proposed to apply the African rotation model to Latin America and Asia, Brazil and India strictly rejected this approach as discriminatory attempt by the North at speeding up the reform process. They denounced this approach as “quick fix by the backdoor”, which would grant Germany and Japan permanent membership, while fobbing off Latin America, Asia and Africa with permanent seats for the region only. Over the years the claims for permanent presence on the Council multiplied. The Arab Group, comprising 12% of the UN membership, called for two permanent seats in case of an increase in the permanent membership, and two non-permanent seats.

As the majority in the GA, the developing countries aim at finally becoming a majority in the Council, too. Their positions and voting behavior on politically sensitive questions are often different from those of the US and UK. In order to avoid alterations to the current power structures as well as potential minority positions of the West, both countries rejected an increase in the membership of the Council beyond 21 seats. In this context it should also be mentioned, that over the years the US, UK, the RF and China continued to firmly oppose any restriction of their right of veto, even by voluntary constraint (Proidl, 2001, 303-311).

It is important to note that the “permanent members are increasingly aware of the unpopularity of casting a veto and it is one of the reasons they tend to minimise its use”. Instead of casting a veto and attracting criticism, countries increasingly prefer to use the “pocket veto” (namely the threat of the use of veto). They use that threat “either implicitly or explicitly, either in the private meetings of the Permanent Five or in the larger Council”. On many occasions, they managed to reach their intended outcome and could keep an issue off the Council’s agenda or soften the language of a resolution. (Okhovat, 2011, 18-19).

In the discussions on the involvement of new permanent members in SC, Germany and Japan (two major losers of the Second World War), the strongest candidates stand out. Council membership will increase Germany’s influence in global relations. Japan is trying to keep its permanent membership position strong by increasing its financial contributions to UN operations. Breaking the link between P5 and the veto power may be an alternative approach in terms of restructuring the SC (Suter, 1998, 195).
3.5. Votes Battle at the Security Council

In Arab-Israeli Wars, India-Pakistan Wars, East Timor, Iran-Iraq War, Wars in the Former Yugoslavia, Bosnian Conflict, Afghan Conflict, Liberia, and Sierra Leone peace-keeping operations were carried out by United Nations Security Council resolutions. For these resolutions, there were fierce controversies within the Security Council. The Korean War, Suez Crisis, and the 2003 Iraq War are included in this section in order to illustrate the subject and explain the developments in the Security Council.

On a superficial level the role of the SC in the Korean War is straightforward. Although Article 39 of the UN Charter gave that body authority to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken…to maintain or restore international peace and security”, the veto power of each of the five Permanent Members, which the “Soviet Union used liberally before June 1950”, caused the SC action to be unlikely in the face of the North Korean assault. However, in January 1950, the Soviet Union boycotted SC, not participating in the meeting to protest China’s position in the SC. Thus, when the war broke out in Korea on June 25, the Soviet Union was not in the SC, and the US had gone on to make two resolutions.

Six-week successful US initiatives in Korea ended suddenly on August 1st, when the Soviet delegation “returned to the body as president”, a month-long turning position. The SC has become a controversial society in which the United States and its allies have struggled against the Soviet Union for a worldly vision of a solution to war and peace issues. When the GA’s annual session on September 19th convened in New York, the SC largely received the UN as a focal point for diplomatic maneuvering in Korea. After November, the SC only received periodic reports from the UN command, and occasionally North Korea reports of alleged assertions by the Soviet and North Korea in the war. Indeed, the United States has used the “Korean crisis” to persuade its allies in the SC to “Uniting for Peace” to strengthen the capacity of the GA allies to respond effectively to crisis situations (Stueck, 2008, 266-267).

“Uniting for Peace” Resolution provided that;

“If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the GA shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including . . . the use of armed force . . . to restore international peace and security.”

The “Uniting for Peace” was the only official effort to rectify the yet unborn status of the constitution to provide peace (Muravchik, 2005, 19-20).
The nationalization of Nasser's Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956, not only “created a crisis” in the United Nations, but also created a “conflict with the interests of the European colonial regimes”. In 1956, they were cautious not only in England, but also in the United Nations to approach the peace in Suez. In part, this warning stems from the awareness of Britain and the United States on the very different motives and policies on this crisis. At the same time, “crises between Egypt and Israel in the years prior to 1956” may have been due to poor records of the SC. In 1951, the council called on Egypt to stop intervening in the merchant bar towards the Suez Canal. In 1955, he repeatedly called on the “two sides to observe” the current ceasefire terms. All of this made little impact.

British, French and Egyptian representatives were approached to resolve the crisis. However, after Israel attacked Egypt in late October, resolutions in the Security Council were vetoed by the British and French. Vetos locked the problem. In a striking contrast, GA played a crucial role in the crisis. This was due to the “Uniting for Peace” resolution adopted in November 1950 after the end of the Soviet Union's boycott of SC. According to this less-used procedure, if the decision could not be made because of the veto in the SC, it could be transferred to GA (Louis, 2008, 280-285).

Consider the battle for votes for the Iraq war in 2003. On one side were the US and the United Kingdom, who sought UNSC “approval for the military venture”. On the other side were France, Russia, and China, who could veto any such resolution. While the Bush administration was lobbying with aid packages for the attempt to win votes for some members who were non-permanent of the UNCS, the French authorities pushed against. To try to save the prerequisites of the UNSC votes from making meaningless veto according to the official rules of the institution. Vetoing one of the permanent members who opposed a military attack against Iraq - France, Russia or China - would block the UNSC resolution. However, even the vast majority of voting votes for a vetoed proposal may have provided some legitimacy for the war. The positive votes of the elected members would symbolize their support from their regions and convey information about the appropriateness of a US occupation.

In this case, of course, there was no US support and no votes. Instead, the United States has built a special “Coalition of the Willing” covering about fifty countries. While the number of allies in the military strike is inadequate to influence public opinion, there is a statistically significant impact of UNSC resolutions.

The story of Yemen and the Gulf War perhaps best illustrates the importance of a “single vote”. When Yemen threatened to vote against the use of armed forces against Iraq in 1990 Secretary of State James Baker III declared “this will be the most expensive no vote they have ever cast”. When Yemen did “vote no”, the United States cut all of its $70 million in aid. Nevertheless, the renowned resolution no. 678 has received the support of twelve members of the UNSC and has been easily accepted without the support of Yemen. Therefore, in terms of the rules governing the UNSC, there has been no meaning in the press and punishment of Yemen. Un Charter states that nine positive votes are enough to pass a decision, so a positive vote from Yemen may seem like a luxury. Nonetheless, the official rules of the UNSC do not cover the full range of US policy objectives. To the extent that Yemen represented the Arab states on the global stage, his vote has a symbolic significance, indicating that the Arab world does not support the Gulf War. So, although the United States is not very important in the official sense, Yemen's vote is very important in the political sense. From a symbolic point of view, the vote of an elected member of the UNSC indicates that a resolution has the support of the duly appointed regional representative (Vreeland and Dreher, 2014, 8-10).

4. Conclusion

No organization in the world embodies as many dreams, yet delivers as many frustrations, as the UN. Nothing could be nobler or more moving than its stated goals, not only ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’, but to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” and “promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”. However, in advancing and achieving these goals, the UN has become a central player only in an irregular manner. For most of its history, the Security Council has become a major force maneuver; The General Assembly is a theater for empty rhetoric; The Economic and Social Council is a dysfunctional indifference; and the Secretariat is inefficient at worst for all the devotion and brilliance of many individuals (Thakur, 2006, xi).

The UN opened great global horizons in 1945. But since then the steps taken by member states have been “small, hesitant and limited”. The world’s society in 1945 had never come close to realizing its dream, its equal rights, and its unified vision in the vision. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, at the reception of the Nobel Prize, described the United Nations as “a place where the peoples of the world were presented to the
designs of governments”. The UN, seized by the governments, has gradually moved away from “We, the peoples” (Thakur, 1998, 1).

The UN organization has not adequately fulfilled the functions expected from its establishment in 1945 to the early 1990s, when the Cold War ended. The military, geopolitical and ideological strife arising from the East-West antagonism during the Cold War has made it impossible for the Security Council to act effectively. For example, the United States invaded Vietnam, Dominican, Grenada and Panama; The Soviet Union invaded Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan; Iraq has occupied Iran. The Security Council is indifferent to all these occupations. In this sense, during the Cold War, the UN has not been effective in ensuring peace and security in the international community. In the post-Cold War period, there were serious failures in the peacekeeping missions such as Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan which were explained in the third part.

The activities that have been shown since the establishment of the UN, particularly when viewed under the theme of peacekeeping, are clearly structurally defective and inadequate, and operationally cumbersome.

The UN is a source of great ideas in the ideal sense and lacks effective means of implementing these ideas. Different units are doing similar work, which causes unnecessary effort and budget expenditure.

Peace operations do not produce sustainable results. A few countries, especially the United States, treat the UN as a means of politics that can be exploited or ignored as well as those in power in Washington.

It seems that General Secretaries (such as Kofi Annan) who can take the support of the US can put out more active and effective studies. This statement means acting in accordance with US interests, which is contrary to the principle of universality of the UN.

Some of the votes cast in the UN are secret, and some votes appear to have been made open. The voting in the Human Rights Commission member and presidential elections is done by secret ballot. As it is known, the US embassy moved to Jerusalem and this city is recognized by the US as the capital. After this development, the vote on the general assembly on the status of Jerusalem was made with open ballot. In addition, all votes in the Security Council are made with an open ballot. This is in stark contrast.

The decisions taken in the Security Council are not covered by the judicial appeal.

In some cases, both the Security Council and the UN have been bypassed. When the US failed to take sanctions from the Security Council in the Korean War, it brought the issue to the General Assembly and made it possible for the UN to intervene with the decision of uniting for peace. In Iraq in 2003, the Security Council and the UN failed to take action, the United States structured “Coalition of the Willing” for intervention in Iraq. In Bosnia in 1999, NATO carried out an air campaign without the approval of the UN. Such situations cause the question of the presence of the UN and its effectiveness.

The UN is a global organization that represents peace through institutional philosophy. However, the use of force, even under the name of peacekeeping, contradicts this philosophy and directly lies within the concept of war itself.

When countries that provide personnel for peacekeeping missions are examined, there is an inverse correlation between the number of personnel and the contribution made to the UN budget. Countries with low share of contributions seem to have given more personnel to UN’s peacekeeping missions. With the status achieved by UN facilities and the social and economic troubles that it is living in its own country, some personnel are exposed to sexual exploitation or human trafficking activities.

In almost all sources examined in the study, it has been determined as a remarkable element that the Security Council is always referred to by the concept of war and its activities are evaluated within this scope.

Another important issue is that decisions made by the UN General Assembly or the Security Council are not being implemented by some countries. For example, in accordance with Resolution 242 of the Security Council in 1967, it was demanded that Israel withdraw from the Arab lands it occupied. But until now, Israel has continued to expand its territory as this decision has not fulfilled its necessity. Such situations undermine the UN’s credibility with the world community.

The permanent members of the Security Council use both the council and the UN to legitimize their own country’s interests and policies. This use is possible unless they conflict with each other’s interests.

It is obvious that for the peacekeeping missions there must be a rapid reaction capable of intervening quickly in the event of a crisis. However, keeping such a force on hold will be costly. It is a fact that the UN is facing budgetary difficulties anyway. Instead, it can be resolved in the form of procurement of service, in the event of crisis, demanding predetermined size forces from predetermined countries (It is known that
many countries have held forces of various sizes under the name of a rapid reaction force for their security.) or NATO, and entering into UN Charter as an obligation.

In peacekeeping missions, the government of the country in which the operation is to be carried out should be supporting it. Darfur case can be shown as a failed example. If the UN decides that the conditions for carrying out an operation are to be established, it should first be looked at in terms of the existing government, and if it is a party that violates the environment and violates human rights, it should start by dismissing the government primarily by taking the majority decision of General Assembly, not just the UNSC ruling.

As another solution, the issue of peacekeeping operation may be defined by clear lines in the UN’s Charter. First of all, the necessary conditions must be established for the peacekeeping operation to be carried out and the level of intervention to the degree of seriousness that arises must be clearly stated. In this way, the Security Council will be able to avoid behaving as the permanent members want.

Contrary to the previous three recommendations, the solution now can bring a different perspective to the subject. Even if the name is peace protection, it is a contrast to the armed appeal of an organization representing peace. By withdrawing from any kind of armed intervention, regional conflicts can be transferred to the already existing regional organizations (such as NATO, EU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Union of South America Nations, League of Arab States, Organization of African Unity) and only the guidance mission can be undertaken.

If an enumeration of all the work done by each unit within the UN organization is made, repetitive tasks can be identified. Even with this simple operation, productivity can be increased and expenditure can be reduced.

The votes cast on the various UN committees should be made open ballot if the principle of transparency is adopted. However, if it is intended to remove the element of pressure over the members, the voting should be done in secret ballot. The United States has openly threatened to reduce aid to the members of the General Assembly in Jerusalem issue. After the vote, US officially announced that her contribution to the UN budget was going down by $ 250 million. In particular, the secret ballot in the Security Council will prevent the inevitable repression of temporary members by permanent members.

Decisions taken by the Security Council should be appealed at the International Court of Justice.

It is clear that the right to veto of the Security Council permanent members is not democratic. The issue of increasing the number of temporary and permanent members of the Council, and permanent new members with or without veto right has been discussed since the beginning of the 1990s. Realistically, it is not possible for existing permanent members to voluntarily agree to give up their veto rights and to include permanent or temporary members with or without veto rights in the council. This is very obvious.

As a result of this work, it seems that a change in the structure of the council is not possible or cannot be possible. It would be a solution to all the ongoing veto discussions of a change to be made under the UN mandate that the decisions taken by the Security Council be vetoed or not vetoed should be approved by the General Assembly’s 2/3 positive vote. Such a change would also remove the concerns of security and politics over decisions that would create broad legitimacy that would not appeal to Security Council decisions.

For the last words, the answer of the question “What is next?” is “There is no next”.

If we start talking about another constitution after the UN, it will be assumed that there has been a third world war. Here, it must be remembered Einstein’s famous words: “I do not know with what weapons World War III will be fought, but the fourth world war will be done with stones and sticks” The presence of countries with weapon races and nuclear weapons, which world countries nowadays enter, pose a serious risk to world security. In World War II, it became the only state to use nuclear weapons and the destruction it created was horrible. It is not hard to see now that a total struggle could take place in the world that could lead to demolition in the face of the increase in the number of countries with conventional arms development and nuclear weapons. For this reason, it is vital that the UN, which has a member of 193 countries that emerged with a mission to preserve peace, must be supported in all areas.

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